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THE INTERNET OF PLATFORMS AND TWO-SIDED MARKETS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION AND CONSUMERS
ROB FRIEDEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
CONSUMERS in both developed and developing nations increasinglyrely on broadband networks to access content, applications, and ser-
vices.1  Carriers providing the broadband link between subscribers and In-
ternet cloud-based content and applications2 operate as intermediaries
with the power to secure payment for services from both upstream sources
and downstream subscribers.3  In most instances, wired and wireless carri-
* Pioneers Chair and Professor of Telecommunications and Law, Penn State
University; email: rmf5@psu.edu.
1. See generally AKAMAI, STATE OF THE INTERNET REPORT: Q1 2017, https://www
.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/q1-2017-state-
of-the-internet-connectivity-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6W2-6MXC]; BROAD-
BAND COMM’N FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE STATE OF BROADBAND 2016: BROADBAND
CATALYZING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2016), http://www.broadbandcommis-
sion.org/Documents/reports/bb-annualreport2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5N6D-
3BH4]; INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, MEASURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY REPORT
201 (2016), http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/publications/mis2016
.aspx [https://perma.cc/L2B7-VLJR].
2. The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that
make up the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these net-
works and the content available via these networks. See, e.g., William Jeremy Robi-
son, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act,
98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199 (2010).  “The increasing functionality of the Internet is
decreasing the role of the personal computer.  This shift is being led by the growth
of ‘cloud computing’—the ability to run applications and store data on a service
provider’s computers over the Internet, rather than on a person’s desktop com-
puter.” Id.  “Computers today have much better storage capabilities than before.
But more importantly, a software solution largely fixed the hardware problem: the
creation of cloud computing and the strength of the Internet have served to create
a system where firms can rent computer storage space.”  Daniel L. Rubinfeld &
Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 339, 363 (2017).
3. One commentator described this market power in greater detail:
To begin with, platforms both enable and benefit from competitive dy-
namics of economic exchange that differ in profoundly important ways
from those of traditional, one-sided markets.  The exchanges constituted
by platforms are two- or multi-sided: they serve buyers, the sellers seeking
to reach them, and often advertisers seeking the buyers’ attention.  Be-
cause the platform forms relationships with members of each group sepa-
rately, it can define the terms of each relationship differently.  So, for
example, it can charge little or nothing to participants on one side of a
target market and make its profit on another side.  A dominant platform
can reduce prices to one group—for example, book buyers or consumers
of professional networking services—below marginal cost and still main-
tain its dominance by charging fees to some other group, and a provider
of free services to consumers can attain and maintain dominance by con-
trolling access to the “market for eyeballs.”
(269)
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ers, providing the first and last mile access to the Internet cloud, have
relied exclusively or primarily on subscription payments from their “retail”
broadband subscribers.  However, their intermediary position makes it
possible also to secure compensation from upstream content and applica-
tion4  providers and distributors who need the intermediary’s downstream
link to consumers.5
A second type of intermediary operates in the Internet ecosystem:
non-carrier ventures that offer a platform for consumer access to content
and applications.  Two types of platforms have evolved: (1) ventures like
Google and Apple, whose software provides the operating system for
smartphone functions, including access to a curated collection of content
and applications available via wireless broadband networks; and (2) com-
panies like Amazon, eBay, Facebook, Google, Netflix, and PayPal that have
captured substantial market share for specific types of intermediary func-
tions.  Operating system intermediaries—e.g., Google Play and Apple’s
iTunes and App Store—have the power to establish binding and non-ne-
Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 146 (2017)
[hereinafter Cohen, Platform Economy].
4. Definition—What Does Mobile Application (Mobile App) Mean?, TECHOPEDIA,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/2953/mobile-application-mobile-app
[https://perma.cc/HT9T-PPD4] (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (“A mobile applica-
tion, most commonly referred to as an app, is a type of application software de-
signed to run on a mobile device, such as a smartphone or tablet computer.
Mobile applications frequently serve to provide users with similar services to those
accessed on PCs.  Apps are generally small, individual software units with limited
function.  This use of software has been popularized by Apple Inc. and its App
Store, which sells thousands of applications for the iPhone, iPad and iPod
Touch.”).
5. For example, Comcast, a major broadband access provider in the United
States, and Netflix, the predominant supplier of video content, resolved an inter-
connection and compensation dispute by agreeing to interconnect directly at
Comcast’s primary national switching facilities upon payment of a surcharge. See,
e.g., Drew FitzGerald & Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix-Traffic Feud Leads to Video
Slowdown, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2014, 09:35 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
netflixtraffic-feud-leads-to-video-slowdown-1392772268 [https://perma.cc/VN65-
QSHK]; Steven Musil, Netflix Reaches Streaming Traffic Agreement with Comcast, CNET
(Feb. 23, 2014, 10:03 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/netflix-reaches-streaming-
traffic-agreement-with-comcast/ [https://perma.cc/2S2E-Q2KL].
Comcast arguably uses its market power derived from its market share of
cable to “squeeze” money out of content providers such as Netflix.  But, it
is not clear that anyone or any firm is harmed, save Netflix’s profit mar-
gin, because it is unclear whether Netflix passes on its increased costs to
consumers or simply eats the loss.  On the other hand, if it could be
shown that (1) Netflix can pass onto consumers the fees it pays Comcast
and (2) Comcast’s practice discourages innovative or new firms or ser-
vices—because they face limited profit potential due to Comcast’s ability
to “squeeze” them or prefer its own or affiliated content providers—then
consumers would be harmed.
Adam Candeub, Networks, Neutrality & Discrimination, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 125, 165
(2017).
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gotiable terms for consumer access to content and applications.6  Other
intermediaries also establish unilateral, non-negotiable terms and condi-
tions, but consumers have easily accessible alternatives.7
Both types of intermediaries can achieve market dominance in a “win-
ner-take-all”8 competition by creating a preferred platform standing be-
tween upstream content sources and downstream consumers.  The
combination of high startup costs and low incremental costs to add sub-
scribers favors market concentration and dominance by few firms.9  In the
market for broadband carriage and in several Internet services such as so-
cial networking, winning ventures accrue scale and efficiency advantages
as more and more consumers join the bandwagon and select the same
option.10
6. See, e.g., Charles E. MacLean, It Depends: Recasting Internet Clickwrap, Brow-
seware, “I Agree,” and Click-Through Privacy Clauses as Waivers of Adhesion, 65 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 45, 48 (2016) (“Contracts of adhesion are form contracts drafted and con-
trolled in all respects by the party in the vastly superior bargaining position, that
leave to the weaker contracting party only two options: (1) adhere to the terms as
drafted by the party with superior power, or (2) reject its terms entirely.  With
contracts of adhesion, there is, by definition no negotiation option; it is strictly
take-it-or-leave-it.”).
7. See D. Daniel Sokol & Jingyuan (Mary) Ma, Understanding Online Markets
and Antitrust Analysis, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 43, 50 (2017) (“Tradition-
ally, antitrust analysis is concerned about switching costs from one platform to an-
other.  However, in online markets, switching costs are often low because of multi-
homing.  That is, consumers use multiple search methods online in undertaking
web searching.  In doing so consumers switch easily from a general search engine
to specialized vertical search engines and apps.”).
8. See Thomas R. Eisenmann, Winner-Take-All in Networked Markets, HARV. BUS.
SCH. CASE COLLECTION (2007), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?
num=33035 [https://perma.cc/C9C8-B3HT]; Om Malik, In Silicon Valley Now, It’s
Almost Always Winner Takes All, NEW YORKER (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.newyork
er.com/tech/elements/in-silicon-valley-now-its-almost-always-winner-takes-all
[https://perma.cc/7RYB-67S9].
9. The University of Chicago Worries About a Lack of Competition, ECONOMIST:
SCHUMPETER (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.economist.com/news/business/217206
57-its-economists-used-champion-big-firms-mood-has-shifted-university-chicago
[https://perma.cc/A8UD-DBXF] (“The big five platform companies—[Google’s
parent company] Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft—earned
$93bn last year and have high market shares, for instance in search and advertis-
ing.  They are innovative but sometimes behave badly.  They have bought 519
firms, often embryonic rivals, in the past decade, and may stifle them.  The data
they gather can lock customers into their products.  They may also allow firms to
exert their market power “vertically” up and down the supply chain—think of Am-
azon using information on what consumers buy to dominate the logistics business.
Investors’ sky-high valuations for the platform firms suggest they will, in aggregate,
roughly triple in size.”); see also Press Release, University of Chicago Booth School
of Business, Events: Is There a Concentration Problem in America? (2017), https:/
/research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/events/single-events/march-27-2017 [https:/
/perma.cc/2P9B-Z756].
10. See Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 309, 334–35 (2017) (“Digital markets suffer from a high level of concen-
tration.  Currently a handful of digital intermediaries with mega platforms control
effective points of access to potential users.  These include smart devices (iPhone
3
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Economists use the term two-sided markets to identify platform func-
tions where transactions occur both upstream and downstream from the
intermediary.11  Many two-sided markets share similar characteristics dif-
ferent than single markets.12  Some new so-called unicorn13 in-
termediaries can acquire substantial market share and billion-dollar
valuations in record time by using digital, broadband networks that can
provide global reach at very low cost.
Successful insertion of an intermediary platform has generated both
positive and negative impacts on consumer welfare, competition, the rate
of innovation, employment, and other key factors.  On the positive side,
intermediaries can promote efficiency, economies of scale,14 and positive
network externalities15 where the overall value in a network and its ability
and Kindle), operating systems (iOS and Android), application stores (Apple Store
and Google Play) and browser entry points (Google Search and Facebook).  The
high level of concentration is largely due to network effects, created when the
value for each consumer of using the platform rises in parallel with the number of
others using the system.  These network effects are further increased by the net-
work effects of big data.  By converging control of content, access, and online dis-
tribution channels, large networks enjoy inherent competitive advantages in access
to an immense volume of users’ personal online data.”).
11. See generally David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform
Markets, 20 YALE J. REG. 325 (2003); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Guide
to the Vocabulary of the New Economics of Multisided Platforms (2016), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2793021 [https://perma.cc/45GH-
JVN7]; Lapo Filistrucchi et al., Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets: Theory and
Practice, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 293 (2014); Marc Rysman, The Economics of
Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 125 (2009).
12. See Tren Griffin, A Dozen Things I’ve Learned About Multi-Sided Markets (Plat-
forms), 25IQ (Oct. 22, 2016), https://25iq.com/2016/10/22/a-dozen-things-ive-
learned-about-multi-sided-markets-platforms/ [https://perma.cc/88KL-GHM2];
Des Traynor, Surviving & Thriving in Two-Sided Markets, INSIDE INTERCOM, https://
blog.intercom.com/surviving-thriving-in-two-sided-markets/ [https://perma.cc/
S26P-Q498] (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
13. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private
Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 587 (2016) (“At first glance, the moniker ‘unicorn’
seems appropriate for the elite companies achieving valuations of a billion dollars
or more.  Each of the members of this unicorn club represents disruptive innova-
tion that has the potential to change the face of how we use everyday services, how
we communicate with others, and how we interact with technology in every facet of
our lives.  Upon closer inspection, however, these so-called unicorns are not a rar-
ity.  In fact, the number of unicorns has continued to climb at what some may say is
an alarming speed, and now blessings of unicorns abound.”).
14. A firm exhibits economies of scale if the average cost of producing a good
falls as the quantity produced rises.  “Many internet businesses exhibit large econo-
mies of scale, because many of their costs are fixed.  For example, many of eBay’s
costs come from servers and software development, and these do not increase with
the number of customers.  Every additional transaction lowers the average cost of a
transaction.” Economies of Scale, INTERNET & BUS. WIKI, http://ibiz.wikidot.com/
economies-of-scale [https://perma.cc/D7AZ-DDWC] (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
15. Mike Moffatt, Introduction to Network Externalities, THOUGHTCO. (Mar. 17,
2017), https://www.thoughtco.com/introduction-to-network-externalities-1146145
[https://perma.cc/AQ97-PLXX] (“Network externalities are the effects on a user
of a product or service of others using the same or compatible products or services.
4
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to generate consumer benefits grow as more users participate.  On the
negative side, intermediaries can extract high prices from both upstream
and downstream participants, erect very high barriers to market entry, and
use comparative advantages to dominate in both core and related markets
such as the collection, processing, and sale of “Big Data”16 about sub-
scriber behavior.17
The business models used by intermediaries often rely on a strategic
determination of how to extract payments from multiple parties.  In-
termediaries can calibrate prices, often appearing to provide “free” or sub-
sidized services to users on one side of the platform, typically downstream
consumers.18  Of course, consumers invariably do pay for products and
services whose advertising costs and other subsidies generate higher
prices.  Consumers also increasingly permit intermediaries to compile in-
formation about their wants, needs, desires, app uses, searches, and other
behavior that can be processed and marketed to advertisers as the best-
ever calibration for targeted commercial pitches.  Privacy intrusions19 and
the commodification of consumer behavior generate significant value that
Positive network externalities exist if the benefits (or, more technically, marginal
utility) are an increasing function of the number of other users.  Negative network
externalities exist if the benefits are a decreasing function of the number of other
users.  For example, Facebook likely confers positive network externalities since it
is more useful to a user if more people are using it as well.”).
16. The term Big Data “has commonly come to represent the drastic increase
in the volume, variety, and velocity of data that can be analyzed.”  Joseph Jerome,
Big Data: Catalyst for a Privacy Conversation, 48 IND. L. REV. 213, 214 (2014).
Technological advances in data collection and storage, along with in-
creases in the use of predictive analytics, are transforming the way that
business is conducted in all sectors of the economy.  Much attention has
been given to the benefits that Big Data will generate; it will provide busi-
nesses with insights about their customers, enabling them to tailor their
practices to better satisfy consumers and identify ways to increase the effi-
ciency of their operations.
Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
859, 861 (2016). See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK
(2013); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big
Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2012).
17. See generally JONATHAN TAPLIN, MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS: HOW
FACEBOOK, GOOGLE, AND AMAZON CORNERED CULTURE AND UNDERMINED DEMOC-
RACY (2017).
18. See, e.g., Filistrucchi et al., supra note 11, at 308 fig.6.
19. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1009, 1010 (2013) (“It would be nice to believe that market forces are in fact
promoting optimal levels of privacy.  It would also be comforting if antitrust law
indirectly promoted optimal privacy options by assuring a diverse range of firms
that can compete to supply privacy at various levels (and in various forms).  But
this position is not remotely plausible.  Antitrust law has been slow to recognize
privacy as a dimension of product quality, and the competition that antitrust pro-
motes can do as much to trample privacy as to protect it.  In an era of big data,
every business has an incentive to be nosy in order to maximize profits.”).
5
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a platform operator can use to generate revenues in ways that most sub-
scribers may not fully understand20 or quantify.21
Platform operators emphasize how much value they confer to sub-
scribers who do not have to make a direct payment.  Intermediaries conve-
niently ignore substantial financial compensation that flows from other
sources, such as advertisers, and frame their role as creating a mutually
beneficial arrangement.  A longstanding platform erected by credit card
companies provides an example of such a “win-win” scenario.  These ven-
tures offer short-term, “free” loans to consumers, and even cash rebates
for card use.  For users who pay within a brief period after purchase, the
credit card use imposes no additional cost.  In this scenario, credit card
companies must rely solely on upstream vendors to pay fees for the
processing of card-based purchases.  Of course, credit card companies can
and do extract payment from both sides when consumers do not pay
within a brief grace period and in turn convert their card use into a high-
interest loan.
Some economists supporting the value proposition of platforms em-
phasize the opportunity for consumers to accrue financial and other wel-
fare-enhancing benefits.22  Additionally, they attempt to show
intermediaries cannot gouge or otherwise cheat either upstream vendors
or downstream consumers, given the ease with which both sides can mi-
grate to other platform operators offering better terms.23  Put another
20. See, e.g., Sheri B. Pan, Get to Know Me: Protecting Privacy and Autonomy Under
Big Data’s Penetrating Gaze, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 239, 245 (2016) (“Big data oper-
ates by analyzing large datasets, so it relies on obtaining large volumes of informa-
tion.  In developed economies today, data collection occurs constantly.  This is in
large part due to the prevalence of objects that can sense, store, and transfer infor-
mation. . . .  As more information becomes constant, it is also increasingly im-
perceptible.  Devices automatically take measurements without human
intervention.  They do not ask the data subject for consent or provide notice every
time they record a reading.  Because data collection occurs in the background, it
easily goes unnoticed.”).
21. See generally Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data, 27
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 803 (2017); Nathan Newman, The Costs
of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 40
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 849 (2014).
22. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture That
Challenge the Status Quo, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 97 (2010) (“The
literature suggests that social welfare would be maximized if the network provider
were permitted to price discriminate on both sides of the two-sided market.  It also
suggests that the prices paid by those on each side of the market can differ widely
and that in many cases, it is economically beneficial for one side to subsidize the
other side of the market.  The fact that the Internet has become increasingly domi-
nated by advertising revenue paid to content and application providers suggest
that it may be socially beneficial for content and application providers to subsidize
the prices paid by end users.”); see also Adam Candeub & Daniel McCartney, Law
and the Open Internet, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 493, 512 (2012).
23. Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Short-
cuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
293, 304 (2016) (“In many high-tech markets, a single firm enjoys a temporary or
enduring monopoly, often grounded in technical compatibility, switching costs, or
6
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way, intermediary overreach can result in declining revenues as partici-
pants use other platform options or revert to direct options, e.g., cash pay-
ments instead of credit card use.
Successful credit card company and other intermediary platform self-
regulation depends on the viability of competitive alternatives.  The risk of
subscriber churn to another credit card company, or a cash transaction,
arguably forces credit card companies to refrain from charging vendors
exorbitant swipe fees and consumers usurious interest rates.  Internet plat-
form operators make similar claims, but in a winner-take-all marketplace,
consumers might consider themselves locked in to the status quo, because
of few alternatives, the ongoing preference by most consumers for the in-
cumbent venture, and the difficulty and inconvenience in migrating to a
less abusive option.  Additionally, subscribers may not consider it impor-
tant to seek alternatives offering less invasive privacy intrusions because
many consumers appear not to appreciate fully the monetary value of what
they allow an existing intermediary to generate by compiling and mining
data about their consumptive behavior.
This Article identifies four types of government responses to price
and quality-of-service discrimination that exploit choke points within the
Internet ecosystem, where large volume of traffic has to traverse a single
digital broadband network or service provider platform.  Governments can
refrain from regulating access and accept aspects of market concentration
as proper rewards to ventures offering desirable content and carriage ser-
vices.  Alternatively, they can impose ex ante safeguards to remedy the an-
ticipated harms to competition and consumers such market concentration
will trigger.  Between these poles, governments can apply ex post antitrust
and competition policy remedies or rely on expert regulatory agencies to
respond to complaints, particularly ones about privacy invasions and un-
fair trade practices.
The Article reports that existing antitrust policy does not support ag-
gressive government intervention based on an assessment that short-term
consumer benefits accrue without concerns for longer term harm.  The
Article also notes that the current regulatory policy favors market forces
even when platform operators control key access points and consumers
have no way to understand and quantify the value of what they confer to
platform operators in exchange for the opportunity to subscribe to broad-
band service and access to advertiser-supported content and applications.
The Article recommends that courts and government agencies exe-
cute their duty to remedy marketplace distortions generated by platform
contractual restrictions. . . .  Indeed, there are dozens of ‘Uber clones’ competing
vigorously in many markets, particularly in Asia.  One might also imagine barriers
resulting from scale—that a new transportation platform would struggle to match
Uber’s number of vehicles (hence reducing dispatch efficiency and increasing cus-
tomer wait times), or a new short-term booking platform would struggle to match
Airbnb’s breadth of choices.  In principle this could impede entry, though we
doubt that this alone would support a competition case.”).
7
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operators engaged in anticompetitive practices, but also to recalibrate ex-
isting tools to examine the impact on both sides of an intermediary plat-
form, the availability of viable service alternatives, and the consequences of
platform market domination on related industry segments.  Courts and
government agencies should devise timely and effective remedies for
resolving valid complaints documenting harm to consumers and
competitors.
II. CONSUMER BENEFITS FROM TWO-SIDED MARKETS
While intermediaries have operated in many marketplaces for centu-
ries,24 emerging digital, broadband platforms radically changed “the tradi-
tional equilibria of supply and demand, blurring the lines between owners
and users, producers and consumers, workers and contractors, and tran-
scend[ed] the spatial divides of personal and professional, business and
home, market and leisure, friend and client, acquaintances and stranger,
public and private.”25  Digital broadband platform operators can accrue
substantial consumer benefits even as they acquire increasing market
shares.  A win-win scenario combines ample benefits for platform opera-
tors and consumers by changing and enhancing the value proposition in
commercial transactions.
Digital broadband platform operators can quickly acquire scale econ-
omies26 and efficiency gains by attracting growing numbers of users and
spreading costs over a large population of users.  The incremental cost to
add an additional participant approaches zero, because broadband net-
works have high initial, investment costs, but very low incremental costs
incurred when adding users.  Additionally, broadband platforms can ac-
24. For example, retailers have used catalogs to offer a vast array of commer-
cial options via a single source:
Inclusion of a product in the Sears, Roebuck catalog gave its manufac-
turer access to a marketing juggernaut with the ability to reach consum-
ers nationwide, the range to offer concert grant pianos and engraved
shotguns, and the power to undercut the prices charged by local [brick-
and-mortar] “five-and-ten-cent stores” for everyday essentials.
Cohen, Platform Economy, supra note 3, at 137.
25. Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 90 (2016).  A
“platform company is launched as an online intermediary between buyers and sell-
ers of goods and services—the ancient role of the middleman—enhanced with the
modern power afforded by cloud computing, algorithmic matching, pervasive
wireless Internet access, scaled user-networks, and near-universal customer owner-
ship of smartphones and tablets.” Id. at 94; see also Cohen, Platform Economy, supra
note 3, at 137–38.
26. Scale economies refer to the ability of a single firm to produce a good or
service at the lowest per unit cost.  “For nearly 100 years, microeconomic theory
said that widespread access to telephone technology was more likely if there was
only one telephone company, because of economies of scale resulting in what
economists call ‘natural monopoly.’”  Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Keeping the Internet Invis-
ible: Television Takes Over, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 121, 127 (2017).
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crue positive networking externalities27 as subscribership grows.  When in-
termediaries reach a critical mass of popularity, non-users see the
advantages in joining the bandwagon, which further enhances the com-
parative attractiveness of a particular platform operator vis-a´-vis other com-
petitors and options.28
Broadband platforms can customize services and offer consumers a
smaller, better-calibrated option.  For example, Apple successfully exe-
cuted a new business strategy of offering single music tracks at a fraction
of the total album cost.29  Consumers win by having the option of selecting
only the desired portion of an album for purchase, Apple wins by ex-
tracting a commission, and arguably music creators and distributors lose
less by salvaging a revenue stream in lieu of nothing when piracy occurs.
Platforms can offer consumers newer and cheaper alternatives, such as
Uber drivers’ private transport instead of tariffed taxi service.30  Private
27. These positive externalities were elaborated in more detail by John
Newman:
Network markets are frequently characterized by positive network effects,
or “externalities”—“benefits to society that accrue as the size of a network
grows.”  In a network market, the value to each individual consumer in-
creases with the number of other individuals who use the same network.
Take, for example, a telephone network.  If very few telephones existed, I
would not value a telephone very highly, or at least not nearly as highly as
I do today.  The more individuals who use the telephone network, the
more individuals I am able to reach with my own telephone—and the
more valuable my phone becomes to me.  Thus, telephone networks al-
low for direct, positive network externalities.  Many of the industries that
have arisen from the advent of digital computers and broadly available
Internet access exhibit similar positive network externalities, both direct
and indirect.  Online social networking sites like Facebook allow for di-
rect, positive effects (much like the telephone industry).  And a broad
range of product markets allow for indirect, positive network externali-
ties.  Take, for example, Apple’s iPod: as more individuals purchase
iPods, Apple is increasingly incentivized to invest in adding songs to its
iTunes Music Store, thereby increasing the value of the iPods.  The cur-
rent market for Blu-ray players operates similarly as does the market for
Microsoft’s Windows operating system (OS).  These positive network ex-
ternalities that tend to characterize new, digital industries can, however,
have less benign implications.
John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 681, 688–89 (2012) (quoting Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Anti-
trust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2001)).
28. See generally John Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility,
and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Net-
work Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); Mark
A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF.
L. REV. 479 (1998); Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 673 (1999).
29. E.g., Anthony Bruno & Glenn Peoples, Valuable iTunes Pricing a Money-
maker for Artists, REUTERS (June 21, 2009, 01:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-online/variable-itunes-pricing-a-moneymaker-for-artists-idUSTRE55K0D
J20090621 [https://perma.cc/ZF8D-5RFZ].
30. See Diana Cao, Note, Regulation Through Deregulation: Sharing Economy Com-
panies Gaining Legitimacy by Circumventing Traditional Frameworks, 68 HASTINGS L.J.
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operators typically have less overhead in commercializing their private au-
tomobiles and incur far less market entry costs than what taxi operators
bear, e.g., rationed and high-cost licensing and regulatory burdens such as
compulsory fixed pricing of service.
Platform intermediaries must deliver a compelling value proposition
to generate consumer use, particularly when alternatives exist with low en-
try barriers and switching costs.  Few platforms start with a dominant mar-
ket share and the ability to forestall multi-homing, the option of
consumers to use many different platforms and to toggle between them.31
Many platform operators encounter competition.32  The combination of
competitive necessity and more efficient operations can readily translate
into the offering of lower-priced products and services to consumers, par-
ticularly because two-sided platform operators can calibrate how much to
charge each side:
[P]rofit-maximizing prices may require charging one side less
than the marginal cost of serving that side.  Empirical surveys of
industries based on . . . [two-sided platforms] find many exam-
ples of prices that are low, or even negative, so that customers on
one side are incentivized to participate in the platform.33
Economists, legislators, regulators, and policy makers find it difficult
to support restrictions or prohibitions on the activities of two-sided plat-
form operators willing to offer subsidies, internally or from upstream mar-
ket participants, that confer significant cost savings to consumers.  Such
reticence may allow the pricing of goods and services at zero cost, or at
least below the marginal cost of production—an outcome normally con-
sidered illogical and unsustainable in the brick-and-mortar marketplace—
1085, 1091–92 (2017) (“Disrupting actors interpret regulation as an inefficiency
that must be avoided, and they attempt to capitalize off the avoidance.  By avoiding
the regulatory regimes, platforms like Airbnb and Uber gain momentum by creat-
ing entirely new markets and new consumer behavior in existing markets.  This
type of business also forces its users to ignore the regulations because of the ap-
pearance of legitimacy of the companies.” (citations and internal quotations omit-
ted)). See generally Hannah A. Posen, Ridesharing in the Sharing Economy: Should
Regulators Impose U¨ber Regulations on Uber?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 405 (2015); Inara Scott
& Elizabeth Brown, Redefining and Regulating the New Sharing Economy, 19 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 553 (2017).
31. See Sokol & Ma, supra note 7, at 50 (defining “multi-homing” as when
“consumers use multiple search methods online in undertaking web searches”).
32. See id. at 48 (“Online markets are constantly transforming.  Indeed, online
markets typically have innovative challengers against incumbents.  Challengers
may overtake incumbent firms through new ideas and technologies.  In such set-
tings, there are low entry barriers.”).
33. David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Oper-
ate Two-Sided Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667, 668 (2005).
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or creates significant market distortion through predatory pricing and
abuse of market power.34
III. CONSUMER COSTS FROM TWO-SIDED MARKETS
Immediate and longer-term costs offset readily identifiable benefits
from two-sided platforms.  In the short term, ventures like Amazon en-
hance consumer welfare by offering a growing inventory of products and
services at lower prices, the product of operational efficiencies and the
willingness to eschew profits in exchange for increasing market share and
scope.  However, in the longer term, consumers may suffer from the loss
of competition from brick-and-mortar local vendors, as well as from the
consequences of ever more accurate assessment of consumer price sensi-
tivity, increasingly invasive collection of subscribers’ consumption behav-
ior, and the brokering of such data by largely unregulated ventures.35  At
some point, online platform operators may consider their market position
sufficiently impenetrable so that they can refrain from aggressive price cut-
ting and forgoing near-term profitability.
Additionally, these operators may have so developed data analytics
that they can quite accurately set and frequently modify prices with an eye
toward maximizing profits.36  Dynamic pricing refers to the ability of prod-
uct and service vendors to change prices quickly by collecting and analyz-
ing data about supply and current consumer demand.37  Rather than set a
34. Some economists and legal scholars refrain from classifying low, or below
cost pricing by platform operators as evidence of market power or anticompetitive
conduct:
[T]he price on each side is a complex function of the elasticities of de-
mand [i.e., intensity of preference] on both sides, indirect network ef-
fects, and marginal costs on both sides.  Thus, it is incorrect to conclude,
as a matter of economics, that deviations between price and marginal cost
on one side indicates that 2SPs are pricing to exploit market power and
drive out competition.
Id. at 696.
35. Data brokers, or information reselling companies, collect consumer infor-
mation and convert it into marketable information about categories of consumers,
or even individual dossiers about a single consumer.
A glaring drawback exists in this convenient set up between data brokers
and marketing companies—it takes place without consumers’ knowledge
or consent.  Because data brokers mostly operate beyond the gaze of the
public eye, individuals are largely unaware of their existence and their
monumental impact on day-to-day transactions.  This is problematic for
two reasons: (1) it invades consumers’ rights to privacy and (2) subjects
them to unwarranted, and often unforseeable discrimination.
Ashley Kuempel, The Invisible Middlemen: A Critique and Call for Reform of the Data
Broker Industry, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 210 (2016).
36. See, e.g., Laura Fleming, How Much Does J. Crew Really Know About You?: The
Harsh Reality of A Mega-Retailer’s Privacy Policy, 31 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 4–5,
10 (2015).
37. See Vivian Adame, Comment, Consumers’ Obsession Becoming Retailers’ Posses-
sion: The Way That Retailers Are Benefiting from Consumers’ Presence on Social Media, 53
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 653, 667 (2016) (“Dynamic Pricing uses consumers’ ‘electronic
11
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fixed price, only occasionally raised or lowered, vendors can make fre-
quent pricing changes based on current marketplace conditions.  While
such dynamic pricing arguably represents an efficiency-promoting, fine-
tuning of price setting, consumers may consider it unfair and discrimina-
tory.38  When demand increases, or supply drops, so-called surge pricing
substantially increases prices from a level most consumers consider fair
and might expect to pay.  Even though low demand and oversupply might
trigger short-term price reductions, consumers may focus on rapid and
substantial surge prices.
A worst-case scenario considers a platform-dominated economy as
severely harmful to workers and consumers, not an extraordinary
opportunity:
A “peer economy” of platform-arranged production will break
down old hierarchies.  Gig workers will be able to knit Etsy scarfs
in the morning, drive Uber cars in the afternoon, and write
Facebook comments at night, flexibly shifting between jobs and
leisure at will.
But is platform capitalism really a route to opportunity for
labor, or just one more play for capital accumulation in an in-
creasingly stratified economy?39
IV. SUBSCRIBER DATA VALUE AND LOCK-IN COST MISSING
IN THE COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS
To calculate the value proposition in broadband networks, subscrib-
ers typically consider the benefits of access as offset by the costs.  One can
readily assess the benefits of access, but the costs are not as readily deter-
mined.  Consumers may wrongly assume that they have free access, be-
cause no subscription payment occurs except to the broadband carrier.
The “free access” conclusion fails to consider two offsetting costs: (1) the
increase in the price of advertised goods and services, and (2) the mone-
footprint[s]’—their record of previous purchases, their addresses, and maybe the
other sites they have visited to determine just how much they are willing to pay for
a product or service.  Those consumers who can afford to pay more based on their
footprint, do, while more price-sensitive consumers receive the same product or
service for less.” (quoting Paul Krugman, Reckonings; What Price Fairness?, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/04/opinion/reckonings-
what-price-fairness.html [https://perma.cc/94TR-RR8T])).
38. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
995, 1029 (2014) (“[D]igital market manipulation creates subjective privacy harms
insofar as the consumer has a vague sense that information is being collected and
used to her disadvantage, but never truly knows how or when.  In the digital mar-
ket manipulation context, the consumer does not know whether the price she is
being charged is the same as the one charged to someone else, or whether she
would have saved money by using a different browser or purchasing the item on a
different day.”).
39. Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 309, 312–13 (2016).
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tary value accruing to intermediary carriers, operating system software au-
thors, and broadband content and application vendors when they acquire,
collate, analyze, and sell data about subscribers’ wants, needs, desires, web
site visits, location, and communications.40
Consumers have plenty of experience with advertiser-supported ac-
cess to content as this model has provided a “win-win” value position in
broadcast radio and television for many years.41  Consumers also have the
opportunity for “free-rider”42 access to advertiser-subsidized content with-
out having to consume the products and services provided by the advertis-
ers.  Additionally, both content intermediaries and advertisers have had
limited ways to acquire data about consumers for better targeting because
of the one-way nature of broadcasting and relatively uncalibrated and un-
sophisticated ways to calculate audience numbers and preferences.
Broadband intermediaries have far better ways to monitor, surveil,
collect, and sell subscriber data.  This changes the value of what the inter-
mediary has to offer because the ability to “mine” subscriber data can pro-
40. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U.
COLO. L. REV. 961, 964–65 (2017); Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 10, at 309; Ken-
neth A. Grady, Mining Legal Data: Collecting and Analyzing 21st Century Gold, 20 J.
INTERNET L. 1, 12–13 (2017); Philip Hacker & Bilyana Petkova, Reining in the Big
Promise of Big Data: Transparency, Inequality, and New Regulatory Frontiers, 15 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 10 (2017); Ramsi A. Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimina-
tion, and Antitrust, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1400 (2017).
41. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 2097, 2100 (1992) (“By ‘subsidizing’” the press, advertising makes mass media
broadly available.  This subsidy enables the media to engage in the expensive en-
terprises of gathering, shaping, and distributing news (and entertainment).”).
42. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and Innovation in the Global Information Infra-
structure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 267–68 (1996) (”A private good is both rival
and exclusive.  Consumption of the good excludes others from consuming the
same good, and relative to a public good, it is much easier to exclude consumers
from the good’s benefit.  Most of the goods and services bought and sold are pri-
vate goods.  Gasoline, for example, is a private good because each gallon can be
used by one consumer only to the exclusion of another consumer. The nonex-
cludability and nonrival features of public goods threaten the ability of an original
supplier of goods to recover her investment.  Nonexcludability means that she can-
not systematically refuse to supply the good to nonpayers while supplying it to
payers.  Nonrivalness means that each customer becomes a potential competing
supplier.  Thus, public goods, and goods that have some public-good characteris-
tics, have a higher free-ride potential.  Conversely, the stronger the characteriza-
tion of a product as a private good, with its commensurate increase in exclusivity,
the lower the free-ride potential.  A drive-in movie, for example, has public-good
characteristics.  It is nonrival and it is difficult to exclude viewers.  Nonpaying view-
ers may not be able to hear the movie, but they can still see it and free ride to an
extent.  The same movie takes on private-good characteristics when shown in a
private theater.  It then becomes possible to exclude people from enjoying the
movie altogether, ending the free-rider threat.  Thus, as the movie takes on more
private-good characteristics, its free-ride potential decreases.”); see also Marina Lao,
Resale Price Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and “Free Rider” Issues, 55 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 473, 477–78 (2010).
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vide an additional revenue stream.43  Broadband carriers have inserted
language in their subscription agreements that confers a nearly unfettered
contractual right to collect and sell data about individual subscribers.44
Unlike content and application providers, as well as operating system
software authors, broadband carriers have no obligation to confer a bene-
fit, or service discount, in exchange for such access.  Subscribers have to
accept the carrier right of data collection and sale as part of what they
have to confer to the carrier in exchange for the privilege to become a
paying subscriber.45
Remarkably, Congress46 and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC)47 have concluded that consumers do not need any FCC guards
43. See B. Bodo et al., Tackling The Algorithmic Control Crisis—The Technical, Le-
gal, and Ethical Challenges of Research Into Algorithmic Agents, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH.
133, 141 (2017) (“When it comes to the aforementioned digital intermediaries, we
as a society have no idea what information and ads individuals are exposed to: we
have no way of knowing how that information was selected for them; we do not
know whether there is a human editor who edits information streams, and if there
is, who he/she might be; and even producers, whose content is being relayed, have
only very limited information on who their audience is, while the public has almost
no insight into the transactions and information flows on these platforms.  The
incentives are structured so that whatever limited information stakeholders have
on the personalized, digital media market, the information will not be shared, so
any meta-information on these markets remains extremely fragmented state, if in
any state at all.”).
44. See, e.g., Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/privacy/expla-
nation [https://perma.cc/FH73-QZWQ] (as revised Sept. 29, 2016); Privacy Policy,
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/5XMQ-
QXBD] (as revised Dec. 18, 2017).
45. For example, AT&T’s Privacy Policy outlines the numerous ways the com-
pany can use subscriber information internally and as a marketable asset.  In terms
of what benefits accrue to subscribers, the company states:
[Y]ou get advertising that’s more relevant to your interests.  For example,
if a particular audience segment, like adults between the ages of 21 and
25 with a certain income range, has demonstrated a greater interest in
movies than other segments, we might send them a movie ad for a movie
geared toward young adults.  This is just one way we deliver content that’s
more relevant.
AT&T Privacy Policy FAQ, AT&T, http://about.att.com/sites/privacy_policy/terms
#collect [https://perma.cc/BJ9C-WGRN] (last visited Oct. 28, 2017).
46. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 115–22, 131 Stat. 88 (2017) (expressing congressional
disapproval of “the rule submitted by the Federal Communications Commission
relating to Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecom-
munications Services”).
47. See Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Tele-
communications Services, 32 FCC Rcd. 1793, 1793 (Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter
2017 Stay of Privacy Rules] (order granting stay petition in part).  In 2016, the
Democratic majority FCC proposed privacy safeguards that did not become effec-
tive with the election of Donald Trump and the conversion to a Republican major-
ity. See Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications Services, 31 FCC Rcd. 13911 (Nov. 2, 2016) [hereinafter
2016 Privacy Order] (Report and Order); see also Cecilia Kang, Broadband Providers
Will Need Permission to Collect Private Data, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www
.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/technology/fcc-tightens-privacy-rules-for-broadband-
providers.html [https://perma.cc/Y39H-SG2S]; U.S. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, FACT
14
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against privacy invasion and overly intrusive data collection.  Opponents to
consumer safeguards created by the FCC in 2016, but not yet imple-
mented, emphasize that digital broadband carriers should not bear
greater regulatory burdens than what content and application vendors
bear.48  However, the concern for regulatory parity considers broadband
carriage as no more essential to consumers than any particular service or
application carried by network operators.  Arguably, no service or applica-
tion rises to the level of public utility or essential service.  Consumers opt-
ing to become subscribers willingly part with privacy expectations in
exchange for access.49  The FCC now considers broadband carriers as sim-
ilarly entitled to extract such concessions, even though existing, or pro-
spective subscribers receive no discount or additional enhancement.50
A majority at the FCC now considers the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) as the primary agency for providing any necessary safeguards,51 de-
spite its lack of industry-specific expertise and its emphasis on remedying
competitive harm from content and application providers with limited ex-
perience about how carriers operate and their potential from harmful
activities.52
SHEET: THE FCC ADOPTS ORDER TO GIVE BROADBAND CONSUMERS INCREASED
CHOICE OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION (Oct. 27, 2016), https://apps.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-341938A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU4R-4KZB].
48. See 2016 Privacy Order, 31 FCC Rcd. at 14119 (Pai, Comm’r, dissenting)
(“But due to the FCC’s action today, those who have more insight into consumer
behavior (edge providers) will be subject to more lenient regulation than those
who have less insight (ISPs).  This doesn’t make sense.”).
49. See supra note 44 and accompanying text for explanation of Facebook and
Google’s privacy policies.
50. See 2016 Privacy Order, 31 FCC Rcd. at 13926–28.
51. In granting a stay to privacy rules specifically applicable to Internet Ser-
vice Providers, proposed in 2016, the FCC stated its intent to rely primarily on FTC
safeguards and general protections created by section 222 of the Communications
Act.
[W]e conclude that preserving the status quo pending further examina-
tion of whether to uphold the Order’s deviation from the FTC’s success-
ful data security framework would benefit consumers, competition,
innovation and the digital economy—and thus further the public inter-
est.  Therefore, the public interest disfavors compelling BIAS providers
and other telecommunications carriers to incur substantial costs and bur-
dens to implement the data security rule pending our reconsideration of
that rule.
2017 Stay of Privacy Rules, 32 FCC Rcd. at 1799–1800; see also 2016 Privacy Order,
31 FCC Rcd. at 13913–14.
52. See U.S. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, RESTORING
INTERNET FREEDOM FCC-FTC MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2017), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation_agreements/fcc_fcc_mou_in
ternet_freedom_order_1214_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7HH-C47D]; U.S.
FED. COMMC’N COMM’N & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FCC-FTC CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cooperation_agreements/151116ftcfcc-mou.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2MHJ-T442].
15
Frieden: The Internet of Platforms and Two-Sided Markets: Implications for
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
284 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 269
Unlike broadband carriers, operating system, content, and applica-
tion providers do confer consumer benefits for the opportunity to com-
modify and sell subscriber data.  With varying degrees of clarity,
subscription agreements set out what kinds of data can be collected and
sold.  Subscribers cannot negotiate modifications of these terms and few
read and understand what privacy rights they relinquish and which firms
may acquire data about them.53  Additionally, subscribers and industry ob-
servers have limited ways to calculate the value in data mining and sales.
AT&T briefly provided a rough value estimate when it offered to refrain
from data mining if a wireline subscriber paid an additional $29 per
month in certain markets.54
One could argue that setting a price for enhanced privacy protection
provides clarity and a new customer option.55  However, many broadband
subscribers may wrongly assume they should not have to pay a premium
for something they consider a basic right.  Because many digital broad-
53. See, e.g., Andrew W. Bagley & Justin S. Brown, Limited Consumer Privacy
Protections Against the Layers of Big Data, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 483, 489
(2014) (“The dynamic ways in which information is transmitted, collected, and
stored through common online interactions exceeds the norms of traditional peer-
to-peer relationships.  Data is used to create marketing profiles, sell advertise-
ments, conduct product analysis, and so much more in the big data marketplace.
These realities illustrate the difficulty for even a user familiar with the provisions of
each terms of service agreement to conceptualize where their data might wind
up.”); see also Michelle Geronimo, Online Browsing: Can, Should, and May Companies
Combine Online and Offline Data to Learn About You?, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J.
211, 212, 224 (2017).
54. See WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP, DATA PRIVACY & SECURITY WATCH 5
(2015), http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2015/03/Willkie_
Data_Privacy_and_Security_Watch_Spring%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2B6-
KA6A] (“As part of its GigaPower gigabit-speed broadband Internet service, AT&T
is offering consumers an option to prevent AT&T from collecting vast amounts of
data about its users’ browsing habits for advertising and other purposes.  The pri-
vacy surcharge of $29 per month—nearly $350 per year—is a model that many
consumer-facing edge providers like Facebook and Google have thus far resisted,
choosing instead to continue offering their services for ‘free’ while relying on their
troves of user data to generate advertising revenue.”); see also Karl Bode, AT&T
Tries To Claim That Charging Users More for Privacy Is a “Discount”, TECHDIRT (Apr. 5,
2016, 06:28 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160329/08514034038/att-
tries-to-claim-that-charging-users-more-privacy-is-discount.shtml [https://perma
.cc/J2NQ-CJRG]; John Brodkin, AT&T Charges $29 More for Gigabit Fiber That
Doesn’t Watch Your Web Browsing, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 16, 2015, 12:38 PM), https://
arstechnica.com/business/2015/02/att-charges-29-more-for-gigabit-fiber-that-
doesnt-watch-your-web-browsing/ [https://perma.cc/WKU2-XQP7]; Elizabeth
Dwoskin & Thomas Gryta, AT&T Offers Data Privacy—for a Price, WALL ST. J.: DIG-
ITS, (Feb. 18, 2015, 06:01 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/02/18/att-of-
fers-data-privacy-for-a-price/ [https://perma.cc/C64F-BWMK].
55. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Opinion, Your Internet Privacy Should Be Up for Sale,
FORBES (Aug. 8, 2016, 06:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/
2016/08/08/your-internet-privacy-should-be-up-for-sale/#31c0f6267ef2 [https://
perma.cc/D3UE-UNP3]; Jeff John Roberts, AT&T Charges $29 for Privacy. Time for
Others to Do the Same, GIGAOM (Feb. 17, 2015, 07:41 AM), https://gigaom.com/
2015/02/17/att-charges-29-for-privacy-time-for-others-to-do-the-same/ [https://
perma.cc/8FB8-QJVX].
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band subscribers do not read their service agreements, or understand
them after a complete review, a misperception of privacy rights has widely
occurred.56  Broadband subscribers agree to terms that accord service
providers virtually unfettered opportunities to exploit the consumer data
they acquire and process.
V. DEFICIENCIES IN EXISTING GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT MODELS
The United States federal government has yet to revise existing legal,
regulatory, and jurisprudential models and frameworks for application to
issues raised by the onset of broadband intermediary platforms.57  Govern-
ments use the same tools, market definitions, market penetration calcula-
tions, consumer protection strategies, and competition policies as though
digital broadband networks operate no differently than legacy brick-and-
mortar ventures.  This section will identify four traditional governmental
strategies and explain how each model ignores fundamental differences
between physical and broadband-mediated transactions.
As a threshold matter, governments decide whether and how to inter-
vene in a specific industry sector.  They may opt to rely entirely on market-
place forces, confident that competition will force businesses to operate in
ways that deliver a compelling value proposition for consumers and en-
gage in no anticompetitive practices.  Other governments may pursue the
opposite: an interventionist approach, imposing ex ante rules and regula-
tions,58 such as network neutrality and common carrier regulation,59
based on the view that unfettered marketplace forces will harm consumers
and competition.  Between these polar opposites, two alternative, possibly
56. See, e.g., Adame, supra note 37, at 667; Fleming, supra note 36, at 4–5, 10.
57. See infra Part V(A).
58. On three occasions, the FCC has opted to apply ex ante regulatory over-
sight. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015)
[hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order] (report and order on remand, declara-
tory ruling, and order), affirmed sub nom., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674
(D.C. Cir. 2016), abrogated by Restoring Internet Freedom, No. 17-108, 2018 WL
305638 (F.C.C.) (2018); Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order] (Report and Order), aff’d in part, vacated
and remanded in part sub nom., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014), on
remand, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561 (2014)
(notice of proposed rulemaking); Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public
Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applica-
tions, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order), vacated sub
nom., Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 653 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (FCC deemed to
have exceeded its statutory authority when responding to a complaint and impos-
ing network neutrality rules).
59. See Justin S. Brown & Andrew W. Bagley, Neutrality 2.0: The Broadband
Transition to Transparency, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 639, 658
(2015); Rob Frieden, What’s New in the Network Neutrality Debate, 2015 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 739, 785 (2015); Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service:
What a Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16 (2015); Tim
Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
141, 142 (2003).
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complementary, ex post strategies exist: (1) apply antitrust, consumer pro-
tection, and prohibitions on unfair trade practices to remedy proven
harms; and (2) use dispute resolution through litigation and complaint-
filing procedures to fashion remedies that typically impose monetary fines
and compulsory modification of business practices.
Each of the legacy models fails to achieve an ideal balance between
governmental regulatory forbearance and intervention, primarily because
the assumptions, strategies, and tactics applied do not make essential ad-
justments reflecting the difference between digital broadband networking
and preexisting channels of commerce.  Additionally, traditional tools ap-
plied by the Justice Department, FCC, and FTC result in less than optimal
outcomes, either by detecting false positives, which trigger unnecessary
marketplace intervention, or by reaching false negatives, which fail to trig-
ger important safeguards based on an incorrect determination that no
harm to consumers or competition has occurred or will occur.
A. False Positives and Negatives
Governments generate the greatest disservice to constituents when
regulatory safeguards unnecessarily replace or dislodge marketplace
forces, or when harm to consumers and competition occurs because regu-
latory safeguards do not exist.  Significant harms also occur when regula-
tory safeguards infringe on markets when ex ante government safeguards
generate a false positive that identify as troublesome transitory or nonexis-
tent harm.60  False negatives generate similar problems when the absence
or ineffectuality of safeguards prevents the regulatory agency from identi-
fying and resolving marketplace harms.61
The three primary government agencies with a jurisdictional link to
aspects of digital broadband platforms have generated both false positives
and negatives primarily because the tools they have used in physical mar-
kets are ill-equipped to identify and resolve problems in the Internet
cloud.  The Department of Justice has statutory authority to investigate
and sanction anticompetitive conduct, but current economic doctrine fa-
vors inaction when identifiable consumer benefits accrue, despite the like-
lihood for longer term financial harm to both consumers and
competitors.62  The FTC has begun to ascend the learning curve on ques-
tions about privacy and unfair trade practices in the Internet ecosystem,
but it has lacked jurisdiction at certain times while at other times it ap-
pears to lack specific expertise in how digital broadband networks and
two-sided markets operate.63  The FCC has generated regulatory uncer-
tainty and overall confusion by shifting between a predisposition not to
act, despite some evidence of harm to consumers and competition, and
60. See Frieden, supra note 59, at 742 n.8.
61. See id. at 742.
62. See infra notes 65–78 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 79–94 and accompanying text.
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newfound zeal to generate ex ante safeguards that may overreach and trig-
ger false positives.64
With three government agencies sharing jurisdiction over policy, eco-
nomic, and legal issues related to two-sided markets, consumers can suffer
from both inaction and overreach.  Currently the three government agen-
cies in a position to oversee and remedy platform intermediary market-
place abuses lack the will to act, largely based on contestable attributions
about the sufficiency of self-regulation and competitive necessity.
1. Department of Justice
The Justice Department has primary statutory authority to enforce an-
titrust laws and generally to assess the competitive health of markets.65
This agency relies heavily on economic doctrine66 to provide guidance on
how to enforce laws enacted over one hundred years ago.  The Justice De-
partment has embraced policies, often first promoted by academics, that
purport to offer a better sense of the potential for benefits and harms in
commercial transactions, including mergers and acquisitions, as well as in
pricing decisions.
For example, the Chicago School67 has provided consistent and im-
pactful intellectual leadership to support the conclusion that government
should eschew marketplace intervention if near-term, quantifiable con-
sumer benefits appear plausible, even if structural changes result in highly
64. See infra notes 95–118 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Kevin Ryan et al., Antitrust, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 987, 987 n.2
(2017); Antitrust Laws and You, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/
antitrust-laws-and-you [https://perma.cc/8EQD-CR6Q] (last updated Jan. 5,
2017).
66. See, e.g., Economic Analysis Group, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.jus-
tice.gov/atr/about-division/economic-analysis-group [https://perma.cc/N5DT-
KLCG] (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (“Antitrust analysis studies and predicts the eco-
nomic effects of strategic firm behavior and changes in industry structure.  Econo-
mists work in teams with attorneys in the Division on every civil investigation of
proposed mergers or possible anticompetitive business conduct by firms (such as
exclusive contracts and loyalty discounts).  We spend time in the beginning of an
investigation interviewing executives at firms and evaluating company documents
and data to determine the best way to model the industry and identify potentially
dispositive facts and empirical projects.”).
67. The Chicago School refers to economic theory and policy favoring mar-
ketplace resource allocation and limited government intervention, focused prima-
rily on promoting economic efficiency.  Economists at the University of Chicago
have achieved prominence in this line of academic analysis. See, e.g., William E.
Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Con-
duct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (“Why
has U.S. antitrust law grown more tolerant in its treatment of dominant firm be-
havior?  In tracing the intellectual stimulus for this development, I often have
ascribed the U.S. retreat from intervention-oriented policies chiefly to the influ-
ence of the ‘Chicago School’ and have treated Chicago School ideas as the princi-
pal intellectual foundation of modern U.S. doctrine and policy.”); see also
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–72 (1998).
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concentrated markets.68  Using this policy predicate, the Justice Depart-
ment typically refrains from objecting to acquisitions of companies that
complement and vertically integrate with the acquiring company’s com-
mercial activities.69  In the communications marketplace, the Justice De-
partment did not object when Comcast proposed to acquire NBC
Universal70 because the combined venture primarily integrated content
creation with content distribution.  Conceivably, a single venture engaged
in two aspects in the “food chain” of video commerce can enhance con-
sumer welfare and promote competition while also enhancing scale, effi-
ciency, and stock valuation of the acquiring company.71
The Justice Department also has embraced economic doctrine that a
very high market share held by one or two companies does not necessarily
evidence harmful market power.  Instead, such industrial concentration
can accrue efficiency and economies of scale benefits without also raising
prices for consumers.72  Additionally, this agency largely favors any com-
mercial activity that confers a near-term cost saving to consumers, despite
68. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF (1978); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
69. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(1984), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/05/18/2614
.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV9J-JQ2A].
70. See Press Release No. 11-061, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs,
Justice Department Allows Comcast-NBCU Joint Venture to Proceed with Condi-
tions (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-allows-
comcast-nbcu-joint-venture-proceed-conditions [https://perma.cc/FF5H-FSLV];
see also Megan Sieffert, Conception to Distribution: Vertical Integration in the Television
Production and ISP Industry, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 157, 166 (2012).
71. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 733
(2017) (“In the 1950s—while Congress, enforcement agencies, and the courts rec-
ognized potential threats posed by vertical arrangement—Chicago School scholars
began to cast doubt on the idea that vertical integration has anticompetitive ef-
fects.  By replacing market transactions with administrative decisions within the
firm, they argued, vertical arrangements generated efficiencies that antitrust
should promote.  And if integration failed to yield efficiencies, then the integrated
firm would have no cost advantages over unintegrated rivals, therefore posing no
risk of impeding entry.”); see also Robert Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman
Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 157
(1954).
72. Courts in the United States and elsewhere in the world have embraced
the view that “high market share in a multi-sided market setting is not indicative of
market power.”  Sokol & Ma, supra note 7, at 48; see also David S. Evans, The Emerg-
ing High-Court Jurisprudence on the Antitrust Analysis of Multisided Platforms, CPI ANTI-
TRUST CHRON., Feb. 2017, at 9, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/
wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CPI-Evans.pdf [https://perma.cc/EX77-EJ8K];
Hein Hobbelen et al., Selected Recent Developments in the Application of EU Competition
Law to Online Platforms, EURO. UNIV. INST.: FCP WORKSHOP (Oct. 2016), http://
www.eui.eu/Projects/ENTRANCE/Documents/NewEntrance/Workshops/Annu-
alConference/Recent-Development-in-the-Application-of-EU-Competition-law-to-
Online-Platforms-Hobbelen-Lorje%CC%81-Guenay.pdf [https://perma.cc/
H2DV-GJKE].
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the potential for longer term harm.73  In application, the Justice Depart-
ment and reviewing courts consider quite unlikely and infeasible a com-
pany strategy for deliberately underpricing goods and services with an eye
toward driving out competitors and subsequently raising prices.74  Em-
bracing Chicago School rationale, the Justice Department and many re-
viewing courts consider such predatory pricing irrational because ventures
may not be able to recoup prior losses, particularly for markets with low
barriers to market entry.75
The nature of two-sided digital broadband markets and the business
strategies of platform operators challenge baseline assumptions driving an-
titrust policies.  The Justice Department has not previously confronted a
73. Cf. Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy,
88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000) (“Predatory pricing poses a dilemma that has per-
plexed and intrigued the antitrust community for many years.  On one hand, his-
tory and economic theory teach that predatory pricing can be an instrument of
abuse; on the other hand, price reductions are the hallmark of competition and
the tangible benefit that consumers perhaps most desire from the economic
system.”).
74. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 212, 217 (1993); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986); Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 2–3 (2005) (“Predatory pricing is a paradoxical offense.  Although antitrust
law values low prices and abhors high ones, the ‘predator’ stands accused of charg-
ing too low of a price—of doing too much of a good thing.  Society considers
predation socially harmful because the artificially low prices of today drive out
competitors and allow the high prices of tomorrow.  But proof of actual high
prices in the later time period is not required, since even attempts at predation
that never succeed and never lead to monopolistic recoupment are condemned.
‘Predators’ can face treble damage suits for pricing too low, even if they never
offend the law’s ultimate concern by pricing too high.”); Christopher R. Leslie,
Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 319 (2010) (“[C]ourts rou-
tinely hold plaintiffs’ allegations of predatory pricing to be implausible because
judges view the alleged conduct as irrational.  In Matsushita, the majority reasoned
that predatory pricing ‘makes no economic sense’ because the alleged conspiracy
in that case failed.  However, in some later opinions invoking Matsushita, the
court’s pronouncement of implausibility is belied by the very success of the alleged
predation.  For example, in Brooke Group, Liggett alleged that B&W engaged in
predatory pricing in order to coerce Liggett into increasing the prices of generic
cigarettes, which would allow B&W and the other tobacco firms to raise prices of
branded cigarettes.  The Supreme Court found Liggett’s theory to be implausible
because it would have required B&W to engage in allegedly irrational conduct—
sustaining definite losses with a speculative likelihood of recoupment.  Despite the
fact that Liggett convinced a jury otherwise, the Supreme Court majority held that
the predation as described by Liggett could not have happened as a matter of
law.”).
75. See Khan, supra note 71, at 726–27 (“[T]he Chicago School critique of
predatory pricing doctrine rests on the idea that below-cost pricing is irrational
and hence rarely occurs.  For one, the critics argue, there is no guarantee that
reducing prices below cost would either drive a competitor our or otherwise in-
duce the rival to stop competing.  Second, even if a competitor were to drop out,
the predator would need to sustain monopoly pricing for long enough to recoup
the initial losses and successfully thwart entry by potential competitors, who would
be lured by the monopoly pricing.”).
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business strategy like that of Amazon that expects to endure decades of
losses generated by a deliberate strategy to expand market share and the
range of products and services offered coupled with low prices that major
brick-and-mortar businesses cannot match.76
Amazon can pursue a “loss leader” pricing strategy because its plat-
form activities extend well beyond serving as an intermediary for books
and other consumer products.  Its “conduct and structure may threaten
competition yet fail to trigger scrutiny under the analytical framework
presently used in antitrust”77 based on its control over consumer data and
relentless pursuit of market share in a “winner-take-all” competition.  An
essential element of the business of Amazon and other digital broadband
platform operators does not trigger any government scrutiny using con-
ventional antitrust measures of relevant markets, dominance, and pricing
power.  Government agencies allocate most if not all scrutiny over a ven-
ture’s core business, while ignoring how ancillary ventures constitute a
key, strategic part.  For example, government antitrust and competition
policy concentrates on Google’s dominant market share in the Internet
search marketplace, without fully appreciating that search dominance also
extends into the market for broadband network-delivered advertising and
the development of markets for the large volume of consumer data the
company acquires, processes, and analyzes.78
The likely failure of antitrust and competition policy agencies to de-
tect long-term adverse impacts to consumers and competition does not
necessarily warrant preemptive steps that would foreclose acquisitions, or-
der divestitures, mandate licensing of key business functions, or impose
neutrality or common carrier safeguards.  Such safeguards could well im-
pose excessive false positive remedies.  However, the current state of anti-
trust economic doctrine and policy appears likely to generate false
negative determinations, based on the failure to consider the broad reach
of platform operators’ business plans and how ancillary and under-scruti-
nized activities help offset the consequences of aggressive below-cost pric-
ing strategies used to acquire dominance in winner-take-all markets.
2. Federal Trade Commission
The FTC has lead responsibility for consumer protection in privacy
and data security,79 but must defer to the FCC when a problem involves
76. See generally id. at 712–17.
77. Id. at 784.
78. “[C]ustomer data can be a strategic asset that allows a platform to main-
tain a lead over rivals and to limit entry into its market.”  Howard A. Shelanski,
Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet, 161 U. PA L. REV. 1663,
1679 (2013); see also generally Rubinfeld & Gal, supra note 2.
79. Section 5(a)(2) of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers and di-
rects the FTC:
to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, savings
and loan institutions . . . Federal credit unions . . . common carriers . . .
air carriers and foreign air carriers . . . from using unfair methods of
22
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ventures classified as common carriers.80  The common carrier regulatory
classification unambiguously has applied to wireless cellular telephone car-
riers since their market debut81 and also has covered all broadband In-
ternet access providers until the FCC’s recent initiative to reclassify
broadband Internet access service as an information service.82
Having split jurisdiction between the FTC and the FCC has the poten-
tial for more false negatives resulting from uncertainty over which agency
has jurisdiction83 to detect and remedy deceptive acts and unfair trade
practices.84  A  decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals85 injected
even greater uncertainty about whether the FTC retains any jurisdiction if
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012); see
also Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protec-
tion, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2232 (2015).
80. See U.S. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 52.
81. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(A) (2012).
A person engaged in the provision of a service that is a commercial mo-
bile service shall, insofar as such person is so engaged, be treated as a
common carrier for purposes of this chapter, except for such provisions
of subchapter II of this chapter as the Commission may specify by regula-
tion as inapplicable to that service or person.  In prescribing or amending
any such regulation, the Commission may not specify any provision of
section 201, 202, or 208 of this title, and may specify any other provision
only if the Commission determines that—
(i) enforcement of such provision is not necessary in order to en-
sure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations for or
in connection with that service are just and reasonable and are not
unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory;
(ii) enforcement of such provision is not necessary for the protec-
tion of consumers; and
(iii) specifying such provision is consistent with the public interest.
Id.
82. See Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,568, 32 FCC Rcd. 4434
(proposed June 2, 2017) [hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM].
83. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC-FCC:
When is Two a Crowd?, Address at 33rd Annual Institute on Telecommunications
Policy & Regulation 4 (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docu-
ments/public_statements/893473/151204plispeech1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4Z95-TNM8] (“Consumers may also be worse off if the two enforcers have conflict-
ing rulebooks.”); see also id. at 7 (“In short, I believe there is little evidence that
consumers will be better off if one portion of the internet ecosystem operates
under a different set of rules from the rest.  If there are two cops on the beat, their
rulebooks—both as written and as enforced—should be consistent.”).
84. See id. at 4 (“[H]aving more enforcers isn’t always better for consumers.
For example, consumers will be worse off if overlapping efforts unnecessarily di-
vert resources from more pressing issues.  When two cops are on one beat, another
beat may be left vulnerable.  Additionally, if enforcers fail to leverage their com-
parative advantages, consumers will be worse off.  For example, one wouldn’t ex-
pect a homicide detective to do a good job as a tax fraud investigator, and vice
versa.”).
85. FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 883 F.3d
849 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
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a venture engages in any sort of common carrier activity.  The court inter-
preted section 5 of the FTC Act86 as foreclosing FTC regulatory oversight
if a venture engages in any manner of common carrier services.87  While
the FTC Act clearly forecloses the agency from investigating and possibly
sanctioning deceptive or unfair acts and practices of common carriers sub-
ject to the Communications Act of 1934, until its reversal by an en banc
panel, FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC88 appeared to exempt ventures that of-
fer both information services and telecommunications services.
The FCC and FTC have executed a Memorandum of Understand-
ing89 outlining each agency’s scope of shared regulatory responsibility.
However, the Ninth Circuit initially did not agree that both agencies could
coordinate and calibrate investigations and enforcement proceedings
based on whether the suspect activities involved a common carrier service,
or non-common carriage, such as an information service.90
AT&T Mobility addressed whether the FTC could sanction a carrier
for misrepresenting the scope and nature of “unlimited” service as well as
whether and when the carrier would “throttle” the speed of bit transmis-
sion when subscribers exceed a monthly usage threshold.  The court re-
jected the view that a wireless carrier could offer subscribers both common
carrier and private carrier services.  Using what appears to be an either/or
analysis the court concluded that “based on the language and structure of
86. Section 5(a)(2) of the Act provides that:
The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations, except banks, savings and loan institutions
described in section 57a(f)(3) of this title, Federal credit unions de-
scribed in section 57a(f)(4) of this title, common carriers subject to the
Acts to regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to
part A of subtitle VII of Title 49, and persons, partnerships, or corpora-
tions insofar as they are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921,
as amended [7 U.S.C. § 181], except as provided in section 406(b) of said
Act [7 U.S.C. § 227(b)], from using unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affect-
ing commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
87. See AT&T Mobility, 835 F.3d at 997 (“The issue presented to us is whether
the common carrier exemption in section 5 is status-based, such that an entity is
exempt from regulation as long as it has the status of a common carrier under the
‘Acts to regulate commerce,’ or is activity-based, such that an entity with the status
of a common carrier is exempt only when the activity the FTC is attempting to
regulate is a common carrier activity.”).
88. 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 883 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2018) (en
banc).
89. See, e.g., U.S. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra
note 52.
90. See AT&T Mobility, 835 F.3d at 1003 (“The common carrier exemption in
section 5 of the FTC Act carves out a group of entities based on their status as
common carriers.  Those entities are not covered by section 5 even as to non-com-
mon carrier activities.  Because AT&T was a common carrier, it cannot be liable for
the violations alleged by the FTC.”).
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the FTC Act, that the common carrier exception is a status-based exemp-
tion and that AT&T, as a common carrier, is not covered by section 5.”91
The court concluded that based on a reading of the FTC Act and case
precedent, it should identify a single regulatory status for AT&T Mobility
and not the combination of common and private carrier activities in which
the carrier engages.92  Noting that wireless carriers like AT&T Mobility can
and do offer both common carrier and information services, the court
concluded that Congress would have enacted explicit FTC authority to
regulate the latter if the legislature intended this outcome.  “[I]t would be
expected that Congress would have been more precise in its language if it
intended the FTC to retain regulatory authority over a common carrier’s
non-common carrier activity.”93
This decision largely eliminated FTC regulatory safeguards leaving
the FCC with the option of offering replacement oversight, something the
current FCC has no intention of doing.  As the FTC historically has pro-
vided consumer safeguards the FCC has not provided, the possibility exists
that legitimate privacy and cybersecurity concerns will go unprotected un-
less the FCC embarks on a politically and strategically questionable expan-
sion of its regulatory wingspan to impose privacy safeguards on
information service providers, or the FTC quickly acquires extensive ex-
pertise on how the Internet works at each level of activity, including first
and last mile content carriage.
Even though the Ninth Circuit en banc panel reversed AT&T Mobility,
the sharing of responsibility between the FCC and FTC will continue to
combine significantly different expertise and case precedent.  The FTC
has focused on content and service providers, while the FCC has concen-
trated on the behavior of the carriers providing the conduit for content
and applications.
In a convergent marketplace, where conduit and content combine,
safeguards are needed for both functions.  Similarly, convergent technolo-
gies do not make it possible for regulatory jurisdiction to apply based on a
semantic dichotomy separating mutually exclusive sets of telecommunica-
tions common carriers and providers of information services and other
types of unregulated content and applications.94
91. See id. at 998.
92. See id. at 998 (“The plain language of the common carrier exemption casts
the exemption in terms of status, contrary to the FTC’s position.  The phrase ‘com-
mon carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce,’ 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2), does
not contain any language suggesting that the activities of a common carrier affect
the exemption’s application.”).
93. Id. at 999.
94. See Rob Frieden, The Rise of Quasi-Common Carriers and Conduit Convergence,
9 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y 471, 472 (2014); Rob Frieden, The FCC’s Name Game: How
Shifting Regulatory Classifications Affect Competition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1275,
1278, 1280 (2004).
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3. Federal Communications Commission
The FCC has struggled for decades to establish the optimal regulatory
treatment of data communications.  The Commission has careened from
establishing ex ante safeguards, based on the assumption that carriers
have the ability and incentive to engage in anticompetitive practices, to
using ex post remedies triggered only when it receives a compelling com-
plaint.  Such administrative inconsistency has resulted from the combina-
tion of ambiguous and outdated legislation; increased partisanship among
the Commissioners; changes in the economic doctrine embraced by a ma-
jority of the Commissioners; and an apparent inability to adjust policies,
rules, and regulations to account for converging technologies and
markets.
The Communications Act of 1934, having last been comprehensively
amended in 1996, provides the FCC with service definitions that the Com-
mission considers mutually exclusive and dichotomous.95  Even though
consumers readily understand that a wireless handset provides both voice
and data services, the FCC attempts to ignore technological and market
convergence by shoehorning all wireless services into either a lightly regu-
lated information service category or a telecommunications service cate-
gory that qualifies for more extensive regulation, largely nullified by the
option to forbear from applying regulations should the market operate
competitively.96
The FCC triggered several court reversals when it attempted to stretch
the permissible regulatory scope of information service oversight.97  It re-
sponded in 2015 with a decision to reclassify broadband Internet access as
regulated telecommunications services that overreaches unless the Com-
mission follows through with its commitment to forbear from applying
95. Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,568, 25,573, 32 FCC
Rcd. 4434, 4447 (“The Commission has previously concluded that Congress for-
mally codified information services and telecommunications services as two, mutu-
ally exclusive types of service in the Telecommunications Act. . . . We believe this
conclusion regarding mutual exclusivity is correct based on the text and history of
the Act.”).
96. 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5603, affirmed sub nom.,
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016), abrogated by Restoring
Internet Freedom, No. 17-108, 2018 WL 305638 (F.C.C.) (2018) (“[W]e concur-
rently exercise the Commission’s forbearance authority to forbear from applica-
tion of 27 provisions of Title II of the Communications Act, and over 700
Commission rules and regulations.  This is a Title II tailored for the 21st century,
and consistent with the ‘light-touch’ regulatory framework that has facilitated the
tremendous investment and innovation on the Internet.”).
97. See 2010 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010), aff’d in part,
vacated and remanded in part sub nom., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir.
2014); Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008)
(memorandum opinion and order), vacated sub nom. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600
F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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most common carrier regulations.98  In these partisan and non-collegial
times, a Republican FCC Commissioner will not trust a Democratic coun-
terpart to make good on a promise to remove or refrain from applying
most common carrier regulations as unnecessary and possibly counter-
productive.  Similarly, a Democratic Commissioner will not trust a Repub-
lican counterpart to take any affirmative steps to remedy real competitive
and consumer protection harms once an information service classification
applies that would permit the FCC to eschew any oversight.
The FCC cannot provide regulatory clarity when its Commissioners
elevate political party objectives above common sense and the public inter-
est.  Republican Commissioners are convinced that regulation imposes un-
necessary costs that translate into higher prices, less innovation, reduced
investment in infrastructure, and fewer jobs.  They consider the telecom-
munications and information services marketplaces robustly competitive
and able to self-regulate, even though consumers typically have to accept
non-negotiable service terms and conditions that include mandatory arbi-
tration99 in lieu of court hearings and near-complete opportunities for
carriers to commodify and market data about subscribers’ network uses.
Democratic Commissioners identify the same adverse consequences to
competition and consumers but attribute the failure to regulate as the
cause.
Throughout the FCC’s consideration of the proper regulatory model
for broadband Internet access, the Commission did not directly address
the impact of platform intermediaries.  It did identify separate elements in
the complete link from content and application source to consumer.
However, it emphasized the potential for “retail” Internet Service Provid-
ers (ISPs) serving end users to operate anti-competitively only insofar as its
treatment of traffic destined for their subscribers.  The Commission fo-
cused primarily on ISP traffic management and delivery roles without con-
sidering whether and how ISP carriage might create a platform
intermediary function.  The current FCC has no interest in examining ISP
collection and marketing of subscriber network use and in assessing the
impact on legitimate privacy expectations.  Having reclassified broadband
Internet access as an information service, the FCC can largely disengage
from broadband oversight.
98. See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5615 (“[T]his Order con-
cludes that the retail broadband Internet access service available today is best
viewed as separately identifiable offers of (1) a broadband Internet access service
that is a [common carrier] telecommunications service (including assorted func-
tions and capabilities used for the management and control of that telecommuni-
cation service) and (2) various ‘add-on’ applications, content, and services that
generally are information services.”).
99. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350–52 (2011)
(deeming enforceable a compulsory arbitration requirement contained in a wire-
less carriage subscription agreement); Arpan A. Sura & Robert A. Derise, Conceptu-
alizing Concepcion: The Continuing Viability of Arbitration Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L.
REV. 403, 404–05 (2013).
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a. The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order
Under a Democratic party majority, the FCC expressed concern that
without muscular, common carrier regulatory oversight, ISPs would create
fast lanes,100 offering “better than best efforts” traffic prioritization at a
surcharge, while relegating everyone else to intentionally slow lanes101
possibly unable to handle even ordinary traffic volumes.102  The potential
marketplace distortion lies in the expectation that ISPs can exploit market
power, particularly for the last mile delivery of content to retail broadband
subscribers.103  Content providers and distributors unable or unwilling to
pay surcharges would experience artificial congestion and quality-of-ser-
100. See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5690 (“Some edge and
transit providers assert that large broadband Internet access service providers are
creating artificial congestion by refusing to upgrade interconnection capacity at
their network entrance points for settlement-free peers or CDNs, thus forcing edge
providers and CDNs to agree to paid peering arrangements.  These parties suggest
that paid arrangements resulting from artificially congested interconnection ports
at the broadband Internet access service provider network edge could create the
same consumer harms as paid arrangements in the last-mile, and lead to paid pri-
oritization, fast lanes, degradation of consumer connections, and ultimately, sti-
fling of innovation by edge providers.”).
101. See id. at 5608 (“The record demonstrates the need for strong action.
The Verizon court itself noted that broadband networks have ‘powerful incentives
to accept fees from edge providers, either in return for excluding their competi-
tors or for granting them prioritized access to end users.’  Mozilla, among many
such commenters, explained that ‘[p]rioritization . . . inherently creates fast and
slow lanes.’  Although there are arguments that some forms of paid prioritization
could be beneficial, the practical difficulty is this: the threat of harm is overwhelm-
ing, case-by-case enforcement can be cumbersome for individual consumers or
edge providers, and there is no practical means to measure the extent to which
edge innovation and investment would be chilled.  And, given the dangers, there is
no room for a blanket exception for instances where consumer permission is bur-
ied in a service plan—the threats of consumer deception and confusion are simply
too great.” (quoting Verizon, 740 F.3d at 645–46)).
102. DEREK TURNER, FREE PRESS, NET NEUTRALITY: INVESTMENT AND ECONOM-
ICS 3–4 (2010), http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-legacy/Net_Neu
trality_Investment_and_Economics.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TM2-Q5PZ] (“Net-
work neutrality advocates worry that ISPs will intentionally degrade basic broad-
band service with an eye toward forcing upstream content providers to pay
additional fees to ensure that content arrives without disruption even though no
such surcharge was necessary previously: Without Network Neutrality, ISPs will
have a strong incentive to reduce investment and make congestion commonplace
in order to extract revenues from content providers willing to pay to avoid traffic
delays.  Without open Internet rules, ISPs will be granted license to abuse their
positions as terminating access monopolies, which is in direct conflict with the
Act’s goals for nondiscriminatory interconnection.”).
103. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 645–46 (“Broadband providers also have powerful
incentives to accept fees from edge providers, either in return for excluding their
competitors or for granting them prioritized access to end users.” (citations omit-
ted)); 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5608 (“Although there are argu-
ments that some forms of paid prioritization could be beneficial, the practical
difficulty is this: the threat of harm is overwhelming, case-by-case enforcement can
be cumbersome for individual consumers or edge providers, and there is no practi-
cal means to measure the extent to which edge innovation and investment would
be chilled.  And, given the dangers, there is no room for a blanket exception for
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vice degradation, which in turn would deteriorate consumers’ quality of
experience.  Bear in mind that for video content, consumers have very low
tolerance for any form of network performance declines that prevent the
seamless display of “must see,” “mission critical” content.104
Without framing the matter in the context of intermediary market
power, the FCC anticipated the likelihood for ISPs to pursue price and
quality-of-service discrimination strategies that could harm competition
and consumers rather than provide different service tiers and price points.
With an eye toward foreclosing harm, the FCC established ex ante safe-
guards to sanction anticipated market distortions, rather than using ex
post remedies if and when such abuses occur.105
The FCC concentrated on the potential harms generated by ISPs with
broadband networks providing the first and last mile links to consumers.
It emphasized the need for narrowly crafted rules designed to “prevent
specific practices we know are harmful to Internet openness—blocking,
throttling, and paid prioritization—as well as a strong standard of conduct
designed to prevent the deployment of new practices that would harm
Internet openness.”106  The Commission concluded that ISPs have both
the incentive and ability to leverage access in ways that can thwart the vir-
tuous cycle of innovation and investment in the Internet ecosystem.
The key threat to the virtuous cycle is that broadband providers have
both the incentive and the ability to act as gatekeepers standing between
edge providers and consumers.  As gatekeepers, they can block access alto-
gether; they can target competitors, including competitors to their own
video services; and they can extract unfair tolls.107
The FCC considered it essential that ISPs not have the ability to ex-
ploit Internet access in anticompetitive ways that would reduce demand
for Internet services.108  To achieve that goal, the Commission established
instances where consumer permission is buried in a service plan—the threats of
consumer deception and confusion are simply too great.”).
104. See Frieden, supra note 59, at 750.
105. See Rob Frieden, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to Network Neutrality: A
Comparative Assessment, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1561, 1562–63 (2015); Jasper P.
Sluijs, Network Neutrality Between False Positives and False Negatives: Introducing a Euro-
pean Approach to American Broadband Markets, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 77, 88 (2010).
106. See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5603.
107. Id. at 5608.
108. See id. at 5629–30 (“Broadband providers’ networks serve as platforms for
Internet ecosystem participants to communicate, enabling broadband providers to
impose barriers to end-user access to the Internet on one hand, and to edge pro-
vider access to broadband subscribers on the other. . . . [T]he record provides
substantial evidence that broadband providers have significant bargaining power
in negotiations with edge providers and intermediaries that depend on access to
their networks because of their ability to control the flow of traffic into and on
their networks.  Another way to describe this significant bargaining power is in
terms of a broadband provider’s position as gatekeeper—that is, regardless of the
competition in the local market for broadband Internet access, once a consumer
chooses a broadband provider, that provider has a monopoly on access to the sub-
scriber. . . . Broadband providers can exploit this role by acting in ways that may
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a clear, ISP nondiscrimination rule in its 2015 Protecting and Promoting
the Open Internet (Open Internet Order):
Any person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet ac-
cess service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not unrea-
sonably interfere with or unreasonably disadvantage (i) end
users’ ability to select, access, and use broadband Internet access
service or the lawful Internet content, applications, services, or
devices of their choice, or (ii) edge providers’ ability to make
lawful content, applications, services, or devices available to end
users.  Reasonable network management shall not be considered
a violation of this rule.109
The nondiscrimination rule established an expectation that ISPs op-
erate as neutral conduits for content without the ability to favor, or disfa-
vor, content.  On one hand, nondiscrimination rules work to prevent ISPs
from providing preferential and superior handling of traffic generated by
a corporate affiliate or a third party willing to pay a surcharge.  But on the
other hand, the rules largely prevent ISPs from providing upstream con-
tent providers with opportunities to secure expedited treatment of traffic
that may need such comparatively better processing to ensure superior
quality of service.  While the rules create the risk of sanctions for generat-
ing artificial congestion to extort higher payments from content providers,
they also may sanction benign or desired enhancements when actual con-
gestion could otherwise result in degraded service.
The nondiscrimination rule and prohibition on prioritizing traffic
also generated uncertainty about what ISPs can and cannot do to tier and
differentiate service.  For example, the Democratic majority FCC had ex-
pressed concerns about zero rating of the wireless traffic generated by a
corporate affiliate and content providers willing to pay a surcharge.110
harm the open Internet, such as preferring their own or affiliated content, de-
manding fees from edge providers, or placing technical barriers to reaching end
users.  Without multiple, substitutable paths to the consumer, and the ability to
select the most cost-effective route, edge providers will be subject to the broadband
provider’s gatekeeper position.”).
109. Id. at 5609.  The FCC defines reasonable network management practice
as one having “a primarily technical network management justification, but does
not include other business practices.  A network management practice is reasona-
ble if it is primarily used for and tailored to achieving a legitimate network man-
agement purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture and
technology of the broadband Internet access service.” Id. at 5611.
110. See WIRELESS TELECOMM. BUREAU, FCC, POLICY REVIEW OF MOBILE BROAD-
BAND OPERATORS’ SPONSORED DATA OFFERINGS FOR ZERO-RATED CONTENT AND SER-
VICES 17 (Jan. 11, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
Zero Rating Report], https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/
2017/db0111/DOC-342987A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/USQ6-RNQB] (“Mobile
broadband providers are experimenting with a variety of sponsored data and zero-
rating initiatives.  While this dynamic environment has benefited consumers, these
business arrangements may raise many of the same economic and public policy
issues involving network owners that the Commission has long considered.  In par-
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Such arrangements can reduce consumers’ out-of-pocket costs, but they
also may distort the competitive marketplace for different types of content
by making zero rated content comparatively more attractive simply be-
cause downloading it does not debit a monthly data cap.
In addition to the specific prohibitions on blocking, throttling, and
paid prioritization, the FCC established a general prohibition on ISP prac-
tices that would unreasonably interfere with or disadvantage downstream
consumers and upstream edge providers of content, applications, and ser-
vices.  The Commission established rules for ad hoc consideration whether
an ISP had engaged in a practice “that unreasonably interfere[s] with or
unreasonably disadvantage[s] the ability of consumers to reach the In-
ternet content, services, and applications of their choosing or of edge
providers to access consumers using the Internet.”111
The Commission applied a more open-ended evaluation than its pre-
viously proposed legal standard prohibiting commercially unreasonable
practices contained in its 2014 Preserving the Open Internet (2014 Open
Internet) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).112  The FCC con-
cluded that it should “adopt a governing standard that looks to whether
consumers or edge providers face unreasonable interference or unreason-
able disadvantages, and makes clear that the standard is not limited to
whether a practice is agreeable to commercial parties.”113
The FCC reported that it would use a “‘no-unreasonable interfer-
ence/disadvantage standard’”114 to evaluate controversial subjects, includ-
ing the lawfulness of sponsored data arrangements where an ISP accepts
ticular, sponsored data offerings by vertically integrated mobile broadband provid-
ers may harm consumers and competition in downstream industry sectors by
unreasonably discriminating in favor of select downstream providers, especially
their own affiliates.”).
111. See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5659.
112. See id. at 5665 (“Based on the record before us, we are persuaded that
adopting a legal standard prohibiting commercially unreasonable practices is not
the most effective or appropriate approach for protecting and promoting an open
Internet.” (citing comments made regarding Preserving the Open Internet, 22
FCC Rcd. 13064 (proposed Oct. 22, 2009))).
113. Id. at 5666.  The FCC identified a number of factors it will consider in
future evaluations.  These include an assessment whether a practice allows end-
user control and is consistent with promoting consumer choice; its competitive
effect; whether consumers and opportunities for free expression are promoted or
harmed; the effect on innovation, investment, or broadband deployment; whether
the practice hinders the ability of end users or edge providers to use broadband
access to communicate with each other; and whether a practice conforms to best
practices and technical standards adopted by open, broadly representative, and
independent Internet engineering, governance initiatives, or standards-setting or-
ganization. See id. at 5661–65.
114. Id. at 5609 (“Thus, the Order adopts the following standard: Any person
engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, insofar as such per-
son is so engaged, shall not unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably disadvan-
tage (i) end users’ ability to select, access, and use broadband Internet access
service or the lawful Internet content, applications, services, or devices of their
choice, or (ii) edge providers’ ability to make lawful content, applications, services,
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advertiser payment in exchange for an agreement not to meter and debit
the downstream traffic delivery.115  The Commission also decided to use
this standard to consider the lawfulness of data caps that tier service by the
amount of permissible downloading volume.116  In both instances, the
FCC saw the potential for an ISP to create artificial scarcity to extract
higher revenues, by favoring corporate affiliates and third parties willing
to pay a surcharge.117  Additionally, the Commission worried that data
caps had the potential for disadvantaging competitors by creating disin-
centives for consumers to try new video programming options, particularly
if a zero rated ISP option exists.118
b. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Affirms the FCC
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the
FCC defended its legal right to reclassify services in light of changed cir-
cumstances.119  The Commission had to convince the court that the Com-
munications Act authorizes service reclassifications or lacks specificity
thereby allowing an expert regulatory agency to clarify ambiguities.  By a
2–1 vote, reflecting vastly different legal philosophies and acceptance of
the FCC’s rationales, assumptions, and evidence, the court rejected all
challenges to the FCC’s Open Internet Order.120
The majority considered its review function quite limited.  The court
opted to apply ample case precedent supporting deference to regulatory
agency expertise on both procedural and substantive areas.121  In a nut-
or devices available to end users.  Reasonable network management shall not be
considered a violation of this rule.”).
115. See id. at 5666–68 (“While our bright-line rule to treat paid prioritization
arrangements as unlawful addresses technical prioritization, the record reflects
mixed views about other practices, including usage allowances and sponsored data
plans.  Sponsored data plans (sometimes called zero-rating) enable broadband
providers to exclude edge provider content from end users’ usage allowances.  On
the one hand, evidence in the record suggests that these business models may in
some instances provide benefits to consumers, with particular reference to their
use in the provision of mobile services.  Service providers contend that these busi-
ness models increase choice and lower costs for consumers. . . . On the other hand,
some commenters strongly oppose sponsored data plans, arguing that ‘the power
to exempt selective services from data caps seriously distorts competition, favors
companies with the deepest pockets, and prevents consumers from exercising con-
trol over what they are able to access on the Internet,’ again with specific reference
to mobile services. . . . [W]e will look at and assess such practices under the no-
unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard, based on the facts of each indi-
vidual case, and take action as necessary.” (footnotes omitted)).
116. See id. at 5668 (declaring that no-unreasonable interference/disadvan-
tage standard would be used to evaluate data caps).
117. See id. at 5666–68 (explaining the Commission’s concerns with spon-
sored data arrangements).
118. See id. at 5668 (discouraging potential of data caps to discourage
competition).
119. See generally U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
120. See generally id.
121. The D.C. Circuit explained that:
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shell, the majority opted not to second guess the FCC, and instead it ex-
pressed support for the Commission’s interpretation of law and its
assessment of how consumers access the Internet and what they expect
from service providers.122  This decision supports a rare instance where
the FCC substantially expanded its regulatory wingspan, despite the gen-
eral trend toward less government oversight.123
The court accepted the FCC’s rationale for reclassification, consider-
ing it reasonable124 in light of how consumers rely on telecommunications
links to access content, largely offered by ventures other than the carrier
providing access.  Additionally, the majority decision considered and re-
jected many of the objections raised in the partial dissent.  In particular,
[W]e think it important to emphasize two fundamental principles gov-
erning our responsibility as a reviewing court.  First, our “role in review-
ing agency regulations . . . is a limited one.”  Our job is to ensure that an
agency has acted “within the limits of [Congress’s] delegation” of author-
ity, and that its action is not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  Critically, we do not “inquire as
to whether the agency’s decision is wise as a policy matter; indeed, we are
forbidden from substituting our judgment for that of the agency.”  Nor
do we inquire whether “some or many economists would disapprove of
the [agency’s] approach” because “we do not sit as a panel of referees on
a professional economics journal, but as a panel of generalist judges
obliged to defer to a reasonable judgment by an agency acting pursuant
to congressionally delegated authority.”
Id. at 696–97 (internal citations omitted).
122. The court supported the FCC’s determination that broadband Internet
access constitutes a separate and standalone service vis-a`-vis the information ser-
vices consumers acquire via telecommunications service links.  “That consumers
focus on transmission to the exclusion of add-on applications is hardly controver-
sial.  Even the most limited examination of contemporary broadband usage reveals
that consumers rely on the service primarily to access third-party content.” Id. at
698.  The court also noted that broadband Internet access providers use informa-
tion services to facilitate links to content but agreed with the FCC that such reli-
ance does not convert the telecommunications service into an information service.
See id.
123. See id. at 734 (“That brings us to our [dissenting] colleague’s suggestion
that the Order embodies a ‘central paradox[ ]’ in that the Commission relied on
the Telecommunications Act to ‘increase regulation’ even though the Act was ‘in-
tended to “reduce regulation.”’  We are unmoved.  The [Telecommunications Act
of 1996], by its terms, aimed to ‘encourage the rapid deployment of new telecom-
munications technologies.’  If, as we reiterate here (and as the partial dissent
agrees), section 706 grants the Commission rulemaking authority, it is unsurpris-
ing that the grant of rulemaking authority might occasion the promulgation of
additional regulation.  And if, as is true here (and was true in Verizon), the new
regulation is geared to promoting the effective deployment of new telecommuni-
cations technologies such as broadband, the regulation is entirely consistent with
the Act’s objectives.” (internal citations omitted)).
124. See id. at 713 (“The problem in Verizon was not that the Commission had
misclassified the service between carriers and edge providers but that the Commis-
sion had failed to classify broadband service as a Title II service at all.  The Com-
mission overcame this problem in the Order by reclassifying broadband service—
and the interconnection arrangements necessary to provide it—as a telecommuni-
cations service.”).
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the majority rejected the partial dissent’s reliance on assertions that reclas-
sification would harm carriers’ incentives to invest in infrastructure.  The
court held that “it was not unreasonable for the Commission to conclude
that broadband’s particular classification was less important to investors
than increased demand.”125  The partial dissent endorsed various filings
that found flaws in the FCC’s economic and market analysis, but the ma-
jority refrained from rejecting the FCC’s overall assessments and replacing
them with general criticisms on the appropriateness of the FCC’s
analysis.126
The court also found no defects in the FCC’s decision to apply its
Open Internet access rules to mobile broadband access.  The court re-
jected the rationale that the rules could only apply to fixed services, be-
cause the traditional understanding of common-carrier-delivered Public
Switched Telephone Network services only applies to fixed services made
available to the public.  The court considered mobile broadband as now
generally available to the public as evidenced by the common use of
smartphones that provide both voice and data services.127
The court strongly rejected the argument that the FCC’s Open In-
ternet rules impermissibly constrain ISPs’ First Amendment freedom.
Common carriers have long been subject to nondiscrimination
and equal access obligations akin to those imposed by the rules
without raising any First Amendment question.  Those obliga-
tions affect a common carrier’s neutral transmission of others’
speech, not a carrier’s communication of its own message.128
The court noted that telephone companies, railroads, and postal ser-
vices have borne equal access obligations like that now applied to ISPs
“without raising any First Amendment issue.”129
125. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
126. See id. (“We see no reason to second guess these factual determinations,
since the court properly defers to policy determinations invoking the [agency’s]
expertise in evaluating complex market conditions.” (alteration omitted) (quoting
Gas Transmission Nw. Corp. v. FERC, 504 F.3d 1318, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2007))).
127. See id. at 715–16 (“Aligning mobile broadband with mobile voice based
on their affording similarly ubiquitous access, moreover, was in keeping with Con-
gress’s objective in establishing a defined category of commercial mobile services
subject to common carrier treatment: to creat[e] regulatory symmetry among simi-
lar mobile services.” (citations omitted)); id. at 716–17 (“In mobile petitioners’
view, mobile broadband (or any non-telephone mobile service)—no matter how
universal, widespread, and essential a medium of communication for the public it
may become—must always be considered a ‘private mobile service’ and can never
be considered a ‘commercial mobile service.’  Nothing in the statute compels at-
tributing to Congress such a wooden, counterintuitive understanding of those
categories.”).
128. Id. at 740.
129. Id.  The court did note that in some instances, ISPs do create and dis-
tribute content, but in such instances, common carriage requirements do not
apply:
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c. The 2017 Network Neutrality Reversal NPRM
With the election of President Donald Trump and the appointment
of Ajit Pai as FCC Chairman, muscular network neutrality rules soon evap-
orated as the Commission reverted to a general promotion of openness
and best practices largely free of any enforcement mechanism.130  Despite
judicial affirmance of an earlier reclassification of broadband Internet ac-
cess as a telecommunications service, subject to common carrier regula-
tion, the Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM proposed to revert to a looser
regulatory classification triggering little or no government oversight:
Today, we take a much-needed first step toward returning to the
successful bipartisan framework that created the free and open
Internet and, for almost twenty years, saw it flourish.  By propos-
ing to end the utility-style regulatory approach that gives govern-
ment control of the Internet, we aim to restore the market-based
policies necessary to preserve the future of Internet Freedom,
and to reverse the decline in infrastructure investment, innova-
tion, and options for consumers put into motion by the FCC in
2015.131
The FCC proposed to apply the information service regulatory classifi-
cation to broadband Internet access132 and to treat wireless service as pri-
vate carriage rather than the existing commercial designation established
by Congress.133  The Commission heavily relied on a questionable conclu-
If a broadband provider nonetheless were to choose to exercise editorial
discretion—for instance, by picking a limited set of websites to carry and
offering that service as a curated internet experience—it might then
qualify as a First Amendment speaker.  But the Order itself excludes such
providers from the rules.
Id. at 743.
130. The FCC proposed treating broadband Internet access as an information
service, subject to Title I of the Communications Act, which does not authorize the
FCC to impose common carrier regulations.  Instead the Commission has an am-
biguous regulatory authority to impose safeguards and to promote goals.  For ex-
ample, the Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM endorsed four principles for
Internet freedom to further ensure that the Internet would remain a place for free
and open innovation with minimal regulation. See Restoring Internet Freedom
NPRM, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,568, 25,570; 32 FCC Rcd. 4434, 4435.  These four “Internet
freedoms” include the freedom to access lawful content, the freedom to use appli-
cations, the freedom to attach personal devices to the network, and the freedom to
obtain service plan information. See id. at 25,577; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4438.
131. Id. at 25,570; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4435.
132. See id. at 25,570; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4441 (“Today, we propose to reinstate
the information service classification of broadband Internet access service and re-
turn to the light-touch regulatory framework first established on a bipartisan basis
during the Clinton Administration.”).
133. See id. (“We also propose to reinstate the determination that mobile
broadband Internet access service is not a commercial mobile service.”); id. at
25,576; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4455 (“Furthermore, insofar as mobile broadband Internet
access service is best interpreted to be an information service, we believe that likely
also would counsel in favor of classifying it as a private mobile service to avoid the
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sion that common carriage regulation stifles investment, innovation, and
employment in the Internet ecosystem.  While offering a dismissive refer-
ence to contrary studies,134 the FCC opted to accept unconditionally the
conclusion that network neutrality constitutes the sole reason for a reduc-
tion in capital expenditures by incumbent broadband carriers.  The Com-
mission opted to ignore clear evidence that Internet ventures continue to
invest billions in both content delivery plant and content creators who
need a robust distribution network to deliver content to consumers.135
The FCC produced no evidence of causation nor did it appear to con-
sider other factors that may have contributed, such as the billions of dol-
lars recently invested in content, e.g., Verizon’s acquisition of America
inconsistency of the service being both an information service and a common car-
rier service.  The Commission explained this reasoning when originally classifying
mobile broadband Internet access service as both an information service and a
private mobile service, and we propose to apply that same reasoning again here.”).
134. See id. at 25,573; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4449 n.116. See generally Karl Bode, One
More Time with Feeling: Net Neutrality Didn’t Hurt Broadband Investment in the Slightest,
TECHDIRT: NET NEUTRALITY (Aug. 24, 2016, 06:29 AM), https://www.techdirt
.com/blog/netneutrality/articles/0160823/09034535313/one-more-time-with-feel
ing-netneutrality-didnt-hurt-broadband-investment-slightest.shtml [https://perma
.cc/G962-GD53]; Sara Kamal, The Truth About Net Neutrality and Infrastructure Invest-
ment, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE: NET NEUTRALITY (May 8, 2017), https://www.public
knowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/the-truth-about-net-neutrality-and-infrastructure-
investment [https://perma.cc/2VXW-2AVY]; S. DEREK TURNER, FREE PRESS, IT’S
WORKING: HOW THE INTERNET ACCESS AND ONLINE VIDEO MARKETS ARE THRIVING IN
THE TITLE II ERA (2017), https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/resources/
internet-access-and-online-video-markets-are-thriving-in-title-II-era.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FF7S-YZTW].
135. See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, 82 Fed. Reg. at 25,574; 32 FCC
Rcd. at 4449 (“We believe that these reduced expenditures are a direct and una-
voidable result of Title II reclassification, and exercise our predictive judgment
that reversing the Title II classification and restoring broadband Internet access
service to a Title I service will increase investment.”).  The Commission relies on a
single study, prepared by a researcher financially sponsored by stakeholders op-
posed to network neutrality rules. See id. at 25,273; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4449 n.113
(citing Hal J. Singer, 2016 Broadband Capex Survey: Tracking Investment in the Title II
Era, HAL SINGER (Mar. 1, 2016), https://haljsinger.wordpress.com/2017/03/01/
2016-broadband-capex-survey-tracking-investment-in-the-title-ii-era [https://perma
.cc/7A9R-BB8W]).
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Online and Yahoo,136 AT&T’s acquisition of DirecTV,137 and several
mergers of cable television operators.138  Additionally, the Commission
did not factor in the cyclical nature of facilities investment that, for exam-
ple, triggers a spike in a new generation of wireless plant, e.g., from third
generation to fourth generation technology, followed by a normal reduc-
tion in capital expenditures as the new equipment becomes operational.
The FCC also ignored the fact that despite operating within a so-called
public utility regulatory regime, wireless carriers have invested billions on
spectrum and network facilities capable of delivering content at near-wire-
line speeds.139
The Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM devoted substantial space to
supporting the proposed reclassification of broadband Internet access as
an information service.  The Commission considered this classification
more appropriate and lawful, going so far as to claim bipartisan support,
136. See Kevin Fitchard, The Real Reason Verizon Bought AOL, FORTUNE (June
24, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/24/verizon-gains-aol/ [https://perma
.cc/K4CJ-97VN] (“Verizon recently completed its $4.4 billion acquisition of In-
ternet pioneer AOL. . . . The telecom giant is one of the most successful compa-
nies in the world (it currently sits at number 15 on the Fortune 500) . . . .
However, growth in the mobile market is likely to slow in the coming years, with
any significant revenue generated by luring consumers away from competing mo-
bile operators or selling current customers more than one device.  The days of
huge quarterly subscriber connections are over, which means the company needs
to find a new cash cow if it intends to keep growing.”); Arjun Kharpal, Verizon
Completes its $4.48 Billion Acquisition of Yahoo; Marissa Mayer Leaves with $23 Million,
CNBC (June 13, 2017, 08:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/13/verizon-
completes-yahoo-acquisition-marissa-mayer-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/
N6AG-9GVW].
137. See, e.g., Thomas Gryta, AT&T Closes $49 Billion DirecTV Buy, WALL ST. J.
(July 24, 2015, 03:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-t-closes-49-billion-
directv-acquisition-1437766932?mg=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/C4M7-
Y8K6].  The Justice Department sued to block AT&T’s purported acquisition of
Time Warner for approximately $85 billion. See, e.g., Trefis Team, AT&T’s Time
Warner Deal Looking Likely, Will it Be a Catalyst for the Stock?, FORBES: GREAT SPECULA-
TIONS (Aug. 9, 2017, 01:55 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/
2017/08/09/atts-time-warner-deal-looking-likely-will-it-be-a-catalyst-for-the-stock/
#5dd78e3a183b [https://perma.cc/VSC9-BQCA]; Derek Thompson, Why the
Trump Administration Is Suing to Block the AT&T-Time Warner Merger, ATLANTIC (Nov.
20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/11/trump-att-
time-warner/546443/ [https://perma.cc/2LK8-C4TQ].
138. For example, Charter Communications acquired Time Warner Cable
and Bright House Networks in 2016 at a cost of $67.1 billion. See Cynthia Littleton,
What’s Next Now That Charter-Time Warner Cable Merger Is Complete, VARIETY (May 18,
2016, 06:25 AM), http://variety.com/2016/tv/news/charter-time-warner-cable-
merger-completed-1201777511/ [https://perma.cc/XV9B-4XAW].
139. The FCC implies that regulatory compliance forces carriers to incur costs
that otherwise would have accrued consumer benefits.  “Internet service providers
have finite resources, and requiring providers to divert some of those resources to
newly imposed regulatory requirements adopted under Title II will, unsurprisingly,
reduce expenditures that benefit consumers.”  Restoring Internet Freedom
NPRM, 82 Fed. Reg. at 25,574; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4449.
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despite the fact that the previous Democratic majority favored common
carrier requirements.
We believe the Commission under Democratic and Republican
leadership alike was correct in these decisions to classify broad-
band Internet access service as an information service and that,
20 years after the passage of the Telecommunications Act, we
should be reluctant to second-guess the interpretations of those
more likely to understand the contemporary meaning of the
terms of the Telecommunications Act.140
The Commission identified ample precedent where reviewing courts
defer to its technical expertise and statutory interpretation, particularly
where the underlying law lacks clarity.141
Ironically, reversion to the information services classification will re-
sult in two outcomes that can have directly harmful impact on consumers
and carriers.  First, reliance on Title I authority does not in and of itself
reduce the regulatory uncertainty which the FCC and stakeholders ab-
hor142 because of the potential disincentives for investment, innovation,
and employment it creates.  The FCC signals that its reliance on Title I will
promote deregulation, if not un-regulation, but ample case precedent
140. Id. at 25,573; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4447.
141. See id. at 25,574–75; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4452–53 (“An agency also is free to
change its approach to interpreting and implementing a statute so long as it ac-
knowledges that it is doing so and justifies the new approach.  Evaluating the
change in regulatory approach in the Title II Order, the D.C. Circuit majority in US
Telecom applied a ‘highly deferential standard’ to the agency’s predictive judg-
ments regarding the investment effects of reclassification, [citing] and deferr[ing]
to the Commission’s ‘evaluat[ion of] complex market conditions’ underlying its
rejection of providers’ reliance interests in the prior classification.” (citing FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v.
FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 707, 710 (D.C. Cir 2016); Mary V. Harris Found. v. FCC, 776
F.3d 21, 24–25 (D.C. Cir. 2015))); id. at 25,574; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4452 (“The Com-
mission has authority, as the Supreme Court recognized in Brand X, to interpret
the Communications Act, including ambiguous definitional provisions.” (citing
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005))).
142. The Commission considers Title II regulation as causing substantial reg-
ulatory uncertainty despite the greater specificity this Title provides as compared
to Title I.  “In addition to imposing significant regulatory costs on Internet service
providers, Title II reclassification created significant regulatory uncertainty. US
Telecom specifically identified ‘regulatory uncertainty’ as one of the causes of re-
duced investment.” Id. at 25,574; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4451.  Title I provides an ambigu-
ous sphere of regulatory authority which the FCC overstepped when it imposed
common carrier responsibilities on broadband service providers that were then
classified as information service providers. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (overturning 2010 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905
(2010)); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (FCC deemed
to have exceeded its statutory authority when responding to a complaint and im-
posing network neutrality rules).
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shows that reviewing courts may not trust regulatory agencies143 to main-
tain consistency.144  The FCC clearly seeks to remove regulatory oversight,
but it also retains Title I, so-called ancillary jurisdiction to intervene as
circumstances warrant, e.g., when a carrier deviates from any of the 2005
Open Internet principles.145
Second, reversion to Title I oversight resurrects the view that the FCC
can compartmentalize Internet technologies into an airtight, mutually-ex-
clusive dichotomy of telecommunications services and information ser-
vices146 despite market and technological convergence.  For example, the
FCC already has had to address the fact that wireless devices combine ba-
sic, regulated telecommunications services, such as voice telephony and
texting, with unregulated or differently-regulated content and informa-
tion services.  Even during a time when the Commission considered broad-
band access as constituting an information service, it imposed common-
143. In his dissenting opinion in a case where the majority deferred to the
FCC’s expertise to determine which regulatory classification to apply, Justice Scalia
warned that regulatory agencies can and will abuse such discretion:
In other words, what the Commission hath given, the Commission may
well take away—unless it doesn’t.  This is a wonderful illustration of how
an experienced agency can (with some assistance from credulous courts)
turn statutory constraints into bureaucratic discretions.  The main source
of the Commission’s regulatory authority over common carriers is Title II,
but the Commission has rendered that inapplicable in this instance by
concluding that the definition of “telecommunications service” is ambigu-
ous and does not (in its current view) apply to cable-modem service.  It
contemplates, however, altering that (unnecessary) outcome, not by
changing the law (i.e., its construction of the Title II definitions), but by
reserving the right to change the facts.  Under its undefined and spar-
ingly used “ancillary” powers, the Commission might conclude that it can
order cable companies to “unbundle” the telecommunications compo-
nent of cable-modem service.  And presto, Title II will then apply to
them, because they will finally be “offering” telecommunications ser-
vice! . . . Such Mo¨bius–strip reasoning mocks the principle that the stat-
ute constrains the agency in any meaningful way.
Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1013–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144. For example, a reviewing court twice rejected a Democratic majority FCC
from imposing consumer safeguards based on a general conferral of jurisdiction
over wire and radio contained in Title I of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659; Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 644 (FCC deemed
to have exceeded its statutory authority when responding to a complaint and im-
posing network neutrality rules) .
145. For a further discussion of the FCC’s Title I jurisdiction, see supra note
130.
146. See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, 82 Fed. Reg. at 25,573; 32 FCC
Rcd. at 4447 (“The Commission has previously concluded that Congress formally
codified information services and telecommunications services as two, mutually ex-
clusive types of service in the Telecommunications Act.  The Title II Order did not
appear to disagree with this analysis, finding that broadband Internet access ser-
vice was a telecommunications service and not an information service.  We believe
this conclusion regarding mutual exclusivity is correct based on the text and his-
tory of the Act.”); id. at 25,576; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4455 (“We also believe that mobile
broadband Internet access service is not the ‘functional equivalent’ of commercial
mobile service.”).
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carrier-type affirmative duties to deal and interconnect on wireless carriers
so that consumers can access Internet services when “roaming” outside
their home service territories.147
The FCC also proposed to eliminate the application of a catch-all
standard used in the 2015 Open Internet Order that prohibited “current
or future practices that cause the type of harms [the Commission’s] rules
are intended to address.”148  This standard allows the Commission to pro-
hibit practices that it determines unreasonably interfere with or unreason-
ably disadvantage the ability of consumers to reach the Internet content,
services, and applications of their choosing, or the ability of online con-
tent, applications, and service providers to access consumers.  It also en-
ables the FCC to prohibit any ISP practice that it believes violates any one
of the non-exhaustive list of factors adopted in the 2015 Open Internet
Order.
The Commission believed that eliminating a standard of conduct will
provide greater clarity to stakeholders, because the current rules are “pre-
mised on theoretical problems that will be adjudicated on an individual,
case-by-case basis, [so that] Internet service providers must guess at what
they are permitted and not permitted to do.”149  The Commission cited
zero rating as an example where the FCC, under a Democratic majority,
investigated the lawfulness of subsidized data access, while the new Repub-
lican majority quickly shut down the investigation.150  Arguably, any actual
regulatory uncertainty resulted from different interpretations of the con-
duct standard based on political party affiliation, rather than the conduct
standard itself.  Removing the standard provides no guidance at all, unless
the Commission has signaled that it cannot anticipate a problem with any
carrier offer to exempt specific types of traffic from debiting a monthly
data allowance.
The 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM also sought comments
on whether the FCC should eliminate three carrier conduct prohibitions
contained in the 2015 Open Internet Order: blocking, throttling, and paid
prioritization.  The Commission strongly hinted that it considers these ex
147. Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio
Service Providers and Other Providers of Mobile-data Services, 26 FCC Rcd. 5411,
5411–12 (2011) (second report and order), aff’d sub. nom., Cellco P’ship v. FCC,
700 F.3d 534 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
148. See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5659, affirmed sub nom.,
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016), abrogated by Restoring
Internet Freedom, No. 17-108, 2018 WL 305638 (F.C.C.) (2018).
149. See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, 82 Fed. Reg. at 25,577; 32 FCC
Rcd. at 4459.
150. See Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Report: Policy Review of Mo-
bile Broadband Operators’ Sponsored Data Offerings for Zero Rated Content and
Services, 32 FCC Rcd. 1093, 1093 (Feb. 3, 2017) (order) (setting aside and re-
scinding a previously issued Policy Review Report and any and all guidance, deter-
minations, and conclusions contained therein, including the document’s draft
framework); see also 2017 Wireless Telecommunication Bureau Zero Rating Re-
port, supra note 110, at 1.
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ante safeguards both unnecessary and imposed without evidence that con-
sumers have suffered, or would suffer, harm if the prohibitions did not
exist.151
The Commission also sought comments on whether section 706 of
the Telecommunications Act provides it with direct statutory authority to
impose regulatory safeguards or simply requires the FCC to assess the
competitiveness and accessibility of the broadband marketplace and re-
port findings to Congress.  This portion of the NPRM may appear insignif-
icant and narrow, but the Commission clearly signaled its view that section
706 provides no statutory authority to impose regulatory safeguards under
any circumstances.152  Even if the current FCC Commissioners retained
the option of regulatory intervention, an already expressed view that the
wired and wireless broadband marketplace operates competitively153
strongly implies that a majority Republican FCC would never seek to im-
pose regulatory safeguards based on section 706 authority.
For good measure, the Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM also
sought comments as to whether any regulatory burden on broadband ac-
cess providers would violate their First Amendment expression rights, a
matter summarily dismissed by the D.C. Court of Appeals majority but
raised in a dissent.154  Lastly, the FCC expressed a keen interest in apply-
ing a disciplined and substantive cost-benefit analysis assessing the finan-
cial impacts of its action.155  While laudable, the FCC’s NPRM provided
several instances where the Commission reached broad sweeping conclu-
sions without the empirical evidence and analysis it now regularly seeks to
conduct.
151. See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, 82 Fed. Reg. at 25,578; 32 FCC
Rcd. at 4460 (“In the Title II Order, despite virtually no quantifiable evidence of
consumer harm, the Commission nevertheless determined that it needed bright
line rules banning three specific practices by providers of both fixed and mobile
broadband Internet access service: Blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization.
The Commission also ‘enhanced’ the transparency rule by adopting additional dis-
closure requirements.  Today, we revisit these determinations and seek comment
on whether we should keep, modify, or eliminate the bright line and transparency
rules.”).
152. See id. at 25,580; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4466 (“We seek comment on whether
section 706(a) and (b) of the 1996 Act are best interpreted as hortatory rather
than as delegations of regulatory authority.  Such an interpretation generally is
reflected in the Commission’s approach to section 706 prior to 2010.”).
153. See Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with
Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, FCC 17-126,
2017 WL 4348640, at *34  (F.C.C.) (2017), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Relea
ses/Daily_Business/2017/db0927/FCC-17-126A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWE2-
2SJ9] (“Focusing only on competition in the provision of mobile wireless services,
rather than attempting to examine the broader mobile wireless ecosystem, our
assessment of various generally accepted metrics of competition in this Twentieth
Report indicates that there is effective competition in the marketplace for mobile
wireless services.”).
154. See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, at 82 Fed. Reg. at 25,581; 32 FCC
Rcd. at 4468–69.
155. See id.; 32 FCC Rcd. at 4468–70.
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d. Restoring Internet Freedom Order
On a 3-2 party line vote, the FCC again shifted its Internet regulatory
posture, this time eliminating rules and regulations that anticipate the
need to establish rules and regulations to remedy practices that harm con-
sumers and competition.156  The Republican majority voted a complete
reversal of what it considered heavy-handed and unnecessary marketplace
meddling that the Democratic majority had created in 2015.157  Relying
largely on conjecture and research sponsored by stakeholders, the current
FCC deemed its reversal as necessary to remedy the marketplace intru-
sions of the 2015 Open Internet Order158 that have harmed competition,
broadband infrastructure investment, and innovation.159
The Restoring Internet Freedom document has three parts: a declara-
tory ruling, report and order, and order.  In the declaratory ruling por-
tion, the FCC reclassified broadband Internet access service as an
“information service” not lawfully subject to Title II, common carrier regu-
lation.160  Before its 2015 Open Internet Order, the FCC treated broad-
156. See Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108, 2018 WL
305638 (F.C.C.) (2018) [hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom Order].
157. See id. at *1 (“We reverse the Commission’s abrupt shift two years ago to
heavy-handed utility-style regulation of broadband Internet access service and re-
turn to the light-touch framework under which a free and open Internet under-
went rapid and unprecedented growth for almost two decades.  We eliminate
burdensome regulation that stifles innovation and deters investment, and em-
power Americans to choose the broadband Internet access service that best fits
their needs.”).
158. See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, affirmed sub nom., U.S.
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016), abrogated by Restoring In-
ternet Freedom, No. 17-108, 2018 WL 305638 (F.C.C.) (2018).
159. See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, at *35 (“The Commission has
long recognized that regulatory burdens and uncertainty, such as those inherent
in Title II, can deter investment by regulated entities . . . .  The balance of the
evidence in the record suggests that Title II classification has reduced ISP invest-
ment in broadband networks as well as hampered innovation because of regulatory
uncertainty.”).  Ironically, when asserting that wireless broadband constitutes a
full, competitive alternative to wireline option, the Restoring Internet Freedom
Order emphasizes the near term availability of fifth generation wireless service that
required substantial sunk investment by carriers subject to network neutrality obli-
gations: “With the advent of 5G technologies promising sharply increased mobile
speeds in the near future, the pressure mobile exerts in the broadband market
place will become even more significant.”  Restoring Internet Freedom Order, at
*49.
160. See id. at *2 (“[W]e end utility-style regulation of the Internet in favor of
the market-based policies necessary to preserve the future of Internet freedom.  In
the 2015 Title II Order, the Commission abandoned almost twenty years of prece-
dent and reclassified broadband Internet access service as a telecommunications
service subject to myriad regulatory obligations under Title II of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, as amended (the Act).  We reverse this misguided and legally
flawed approach and restore broadband Internet access service to its Title I infor-
mation service classification.  We find that reclassification as an information service
best comports with the text and structure of the Act, Commission precedent, and
our policy objectives.  We thus return to the approach to broadband Internet ac-
cess service affirmed as reasonable by the U.S. Supreme Court.”).
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band access as an information service and the Supreme Court deferred to
the Commission’s regulatory judgment in the Brand X161 case.  However,
the FCC attempted to use its ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of the
Communications Act to justify regulatory safeguards twice considered as
unlawful common-carrier-type duties by reviewing courts.162
The Restoring Internet Freedom Order reclassified wireless broad-
band Internet access service as a private mobile service163 in an attempt to
eliminate the common carrier responsibilities created by Congress for so-
called Commercial Mobile Radio Service.164  The Order also removes the
FCC from using its telecommunications-specific expertise to guard against
possible antitrust, consumer protection, and privacy violations.  Instead,
the Federal Trade Commission will add this responsibility165 to its broad
oversight wingspan.166
The report and order portion created a transparency requirement for
broadband carriers to disclose information about their practices to con-
sumers, entrepreneurs, and the Commission, including any blocking,
throttling, paid prioritization, or affiliated prioritization.167  The FCC con-
161. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
162. See 2010 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010), aff’d in part,
vacated and remanded in part sub nom., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir.
2014); Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008), vacated sub nom., Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600
F.3d 642, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (FCC deemed to have exceeded its statutory author-
ity when responding to a complaint and imposing network neutrality rules).
163. See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, at *2 (“We also reinstate the pri-
vate mobile service classification of mobile broadband Internet access service and
return to the Commission’s definition of ‘interconnected service’ that existed
prior to 2015.  We determine that this light-touch information service framework
will promote investment and innovation better than applying costly and restrictive
laws of a bygone era to broadband Internet access service.”).
164. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1) (2012).
165. See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, at *2 (“Our balanced approach
also restores the authority of the nation’s most experienced cop on the privacy
beat—the Federal Trade Commission—to police the privacy practices of Internet
Service Providers (ISPs).”).
166. In FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that the FTC lacked jurisdiction over any venture that provided both services law-
fully within its jurisdiction and those outside its jurisdiction, such as common car-
rier telecommunications services.  835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 883 F.3d 849
(9th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
167. See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, at *2 (“Next, we require ISPs to
be transparent.  Disclosure of network management practices, performance, and
commercial terms of service is important for Internet freedom because it helps
consumers choose what works best for them and enables entrepreneurs and other
small businesses to get technical information needed to innovate.  Individual con-
sumers, not the government, decide what Internet access service best meets their
individualized needs.  We return to the transparency rule the Commission adopted
in 2010 with certain limited modifications to promote additional transparency, and
we eliminate certain reporting requirements adopted in the Title II Order that we
find to be unnecessary and unduly burdensome.”).
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siders disclosure sufficient instead of an absolute prohibition of the prac-
tices mentioned above.  The Commission considers the “bright line” rules
created in the 2015 Open Internet Order as too expensive and con-
straining.  Additionally, the Commission eliminated the Internet Conduct
Standard on grounds that it was vague and could prevent innovative ISP
business models and interfere with their commercial relationship both
downstream to retail broadband consumers and upstream to other ISPs,
Content Distribution Networks, such as Akamai, and content creators.168
The order portion unilaterally shuts down any additional fact finding
and public comment filing opportunities, finding that that the public in-
terest would not be served by adding to the already voluminous record in
this proceeding.169
VI. A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF PLATFORM COSTS AND BENEFITS
Consumers and governments may not fully understand the tradeoffs
when digital broadband intermediaries dominate many market segments
including first and last mile content carriage, smartphone and computer
operating systems, and a variety of content and applications market seg-
ments including Internet search, social networking, and Internet-medi-
ated retail commerce.  One can readily appreciate the upside consumer
benefits in having access to advertiser-supported content and Internet
markets subsidized by ventures willing to forego short-term profits for
longer term market share and diversification (shelf-space).  A more diffi-
cult undertaking calculates what direct and indirect costs consumers in-
cur, presently and in the future, for the opportunity to participate in
winner take all two-sided markets.
Prevailing economic doctrine, widely embraced by government legis-
lators, judges, and regulators, favors an inclination not to intervene in the
marketplace when identifiable, near-term cost savings and other welfare
enhancements flow to consumers.  However, it has become increasingly
clear that consumers have to contribute more value than what they might
infer from widespread promotion of “free” and subsidized access.  Last
mile carriers, app store vendors, and many dominant firms in the Internet
168. See id. at *86 (“We eliminate the conduct rules adopted in the Title II
Order—including the general conduct rule and the prohibitions on paid prioritiza-
tion, blocking, and throttling.  We do so for three reasons.  First, the transparency
rule we adopt, in combination with the state of broadband Internet access service
competition and the antitrust and consumer protection laws, obviates the need for
conduct rules by achieving comparable benefits at lower cost.  Second, scrutinizing
closely each prior conduct rule, we find that the costs of each rule outweigh its
benefits.  Third, the record does not identify any legal authority to adopt conduct
rules for all ISPs, and we decline to distort the market with a patchwork of non-
uniform, limited-purpose rules.”).
169. See id. at *119 (“We are convinced that we have a full and complete re-
cord on which to base our determination today without incorporating . . . [addi-
tional] materials.”).
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ecosystem have mastered the ability to acquire, market, and sell subscriber
data that constitutes the value exchanged by subscribers for access.
In the short run, the value proposition from participating in two-sided
markets may decline as consumers begin to understand the monetary
value of the network usage data they generate and consent to having plat-
form operators convert into revenue from advertisers and through dy-
namic pricing.  In the longer term, the commodification of consumer data
may accrue the highest strategic and financial advantages for ventures that
already have successfully exploited positive network externalities and have
acquired large market shares.  Whether this advantage stifles innovation
and competition depends on the ability of consumers to change their sub-
scriptions and actually do so.
In the Internet ecosystem, lock-in can occur when consumers lack
complete information about what they have to pay and what they lose in
exchange for the opportunity to become a subscriber.170  In addition to
the transaction costs incurred in looking for an alternative and subscribing
to it, prospective churning consumers have to identify a greater welfare
enhancement, lower costs, or both.  Possibly, few consumers have the dis-
position and wherewithal to undertake regular cost-benefit analyses as well
as a determination whether to stick with the status quo or seek better
terms and conditions.
Simply put, digital broadband consumers may likely suffer more sig-
nificant, but not readily quantifiable harms, as digital broadband in-
termediaries find new and more precise ways to maximize revenues from
both upstream and downstream sources.  Broadband carriers and other
platform operators will attempt to create ever more diverse and profitable
revenue streams by mining, marketing, and selling downstream subscriber
usage data.  Additionally, such intermediaries will continue to impose
commissions, surcharges, and other fees on upstream content and applica-
tions vendors.
Government agencies with jurisdiction to monitor such actions ap-
pear ill-equipped to provide effective oversight, based on their fealty to
now questionable economic and antitrust theory, their inability or unwill-
ingness to consider costs and benefits on both sides of the two-sided mar-
ket, and their emphasis on short-term consumer benefits that may not
seem as generous as initially estimated.  The FCC disserves the public in-
terest given its predilection to find false positive problems ostensibly reme-
died with ex ante safeguards when Democrats have a majority and false
negatives when a Republican majority removes consumer safeguards and
fails to establish ex post remedies, despite the likelihood that disputes and
conflicts with arise.
170. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 11, at 363 (defining “lock-in effects” as “where
consumers may be reluctant to switch to a new network and lose the benefits of
network externalities unless others also switch”).
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Additionally, the multiple-decade emphasis on network neutrality has
distracted the FCC and the other agencies having partial jurisdiction.171
The fixation with last mile downstream parity of access largely ignores
what platform intermediaries can do behind the scenes with data mining
techniques that extract marketable and valuable information about sub-
scriber behavior.  Narrowing the focus to the potential for unlawful quality
of service discrimination of downstream content carriage leaves the FCC
with little time, energy, and inclination to consider what kinds of harms
can result from the collection of data about what content subscribers ac-
cess and how intermediaries can use this data to erect even higher barriers
to market entry and competition.
A. The Way Forward
Regulatory agencies with jurisdiction to safeguard consumers and re-
viewing courts should better calibrate the tools they use to investigate the
potentially harmful effects of platform intermediaries on competition and
consumers, with emphasis on the potential for privacy intrusions, unfair
trade practices, market concentration, and anticompetitive tactics.  The
goals for recalibration should focus on acquiring a better understanding
of platform operator practices and their impacts, rather than serve as a
justification for more intrusive government oversight.  Such a holistic ap-
proach can better assess the costs and benefits generated by platform
intermediaries.
1. Assess Impacts on Both Sides of a Platform
To achieve greater clarity on the potential for beneficial and harmful
impact, courts and government agencies should examine platform opera-
tions on both upstream and downstream market sides.  Using a cost-bene-
fit analysis, they may determine that harmful impacts on one side are
offset by benefits on the other side.  In other instances, they may identify
greater harms or benefits when examining both sides.
A complete assessment of market impacts on both sides of a platform
promotes a thorough and fair assessment without favoring intervention or
forbearance.  For example, in United States v. American Express Co.,172 the
171. See Cohen, Platform Economy, supra note 3, at 188.  (“[T]he current regu-
latory structure does not permit any regulator to consider the full group of actors
whose activities determine the neutrality or nonneutrality of access to networked
digital communications capabilities. . . . Platforms and their government relations
firms have exploited the apparent unfairness; for example, Google has adopted
the posture of a supplicant seeking nondiscriminatory access to connection points
for its Google Fiber initiative, even though it and other dominant platform firms
‘already benefit from what are essentially internet fast lanes, and this has been the
case for years.’” (quoting Robert McMillan, What Everyone Gets Wrong in the Debate
over Net Neutrality, WIRED (June 23, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/06/net_
neutrality_missing [https://perma.cc/8YW9-YEBV])).
172. 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub. nom., Ohio v. Am. Express
Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017).
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered both sides of the credit card
platform and reversed a lower court’s decision that could have harmed
consumers in the long run even as it appeared to benefit them in the short
term. American Express examined market impacts on both sides of the
credit card platform marketplace with an eye toward assessing the com-
plete financial impact of a credit card company’s rules precluding vendors
that accept multiple types of credit cards from encouraging consumers to
use one that would impose lower fees on vendors.  The court rejected the
lower court’s singular focus on upstream vendors, because so-called anti-
steering rules can have a direct impact on both upstream vendors and
downstream consumers as well as impact the relationships and interac-
tions173 between both market segments and the issuers of credit cards.
The interdependency that causes price changes on one side can result
in demand changes on the other side.  If a merchant finds that a network’s
fees to accept a particular card exceed the benefit that the merchant gains
by accepting that card, then the merchant likely will choose not to accept
the card.  On the other side, if a cardholder finds that too few merchants
accept a particular card, then the cardholder likely will not want to use
that card in the first place.  Accordingly, in order to succeed, a credit-card
network must “find an effective method for balancing the prices on the
two sides of the market.”174
The court undertook a comparison of costs and benefits affecting
both vendors and credit card users.  While anti-steering rules mandated by
credit card issuers can constitute an illegal vertical restraint on trade by
reducing competition among credit card companies, the court considered
the potential for offsetting, positive financial impact on credit card users
through lower costs and more financial incentives to use a specific card.175
A thorough examination of impacts to both upstream vendors ac-
cepting credit cards and downstream consumers using them motivated the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse the lower court’s decision find-
173. See id. at 185–86 (“The functions provided by the credit-card industry are
highly interdependent and, at the cardholder/merchant-acceptance level, result in
what has been called a ‘two-sided market.’  The cardholder and the merchant both
depend upon widespread acceptance of a card.  That is, cardholders benefit from
holding a card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and
merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number of cardholders
use it.”).
174. Id. at 186 (quoting Jean–Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, An Economic Anal-
ysis of the Determination of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems, 2 REV. NETWORK
ECON. 69, 72 (2003)).
175. See id. at 202 (“In order to remain competitive on the cardholder side of
the platform, a payment-card network might need to increase cardholder re-
wards—or, in other words, cut prices to cardholders.  This, in turn, might diminish
the network’s profitability from the hypothetical price increase.  If the network
chose in that situation not to increase cardholder rewards, then merchant attrition
likely would continue increasing as a result of the reduction in cardholders.  Over
time, the reduction in transactions could make the hypothetical price increase
unprofitable.”).
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ing anticompetitive harm only to vendors.  The appellate court identified
offsetting benefits to consumers even when credit card company rules im-
pose higher costs and limit ways for vendors to steer consumers to cards
with lower vendor fees.176
The Second Circuit opted to examine both sides of the credit card
market, because variance in costs incurred by both vendors and credit
card users can impact both sides of the platform operated by a credit card
issuer.  In light of the interdependency of product and service vendors
and consumers using credit cards, the court identified two joint market
effects not considered by the lower court: (1) impact of anti-steering rules
on the level of card issuer market competition and (2) the impact of credit
card issuer anti-steering rules on their incentives to offer usage induce-
ments to consumers.177  While the credit card marketplace is concen-
trated with only four companies and evidences substantial barriers to
market entry, the court noted the ease with which consumers can shift
card allegiance based on many factors including the costs incurred by us-
ing a specific card as well as the financial inducements offered by credit
card issuers to encourage subscriber loyalty.178
The American Express case emphasizes the need for courts, and by ex-
tension regulatory agencies, to consider the relationship between up-
stream and downstream market participants in terms of their impact on
each other—i.e., interdependency—and in terms of their relationship
with the platform intermediary.  In the credit card ecosystem, the availabil-
ity of alternative credit cards and the ease with which consumers can
change allegiances evidence a competitive credit card platform market-
place with significant consumer sensitivity to comparative costs and bene-
fits accruing from the use of specific cards.
The digital broadband ecosystem may not have the same competitive
alternatives.  Similarly, high barriers to market entry, combined with all-or-
nothing scale opportunities from positive networking externalities, pro-
mote highly concentrated market segments.  For example, the wireless
marketplace in the United States also has four major, national carriers179
176. See id.
177. See id. at 204–05.
178. See id. at 189–90, 205 (“Both merchants and cardholders engage in ‘mul-
tihoming,’ meaning that both cardholders and merchants may choose to use or
accept several different cards.  Multihoming tends to lower prices by functioning
essentially as an availability of substitutes. . . . A cardholder often has more choices
of payment method than a merchant has the ability to accept, and thus the card-
holder may simply opt not to own cards that charge membership fees or offer
relatively few cardholder benefits.  Largely due to multihoming, not all merchants
or all cardholders use all payment-card networks.”); id. at 203 (“A firm that can
attract customer loyalty only by reducing its prices does not have the power to in-
crease prices unilaterally.”).
179. The market research firm Strategy Analytics reports that in the first quar-
ter of 2017, Verizon had 146.013 million subscribers and generated $15.778 billion
in annual revenue.  AT&T had 134.218 million subscribers and generated $14.538
billion in annual revenue.  TMobile had 72.597 million subscribers and generated
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and the wired broadband market is similarly concentrated.180  Unlike the
credit card marketplace, broadband access consumers cannot easily mi-
grate from one carrier to another in light of service contracts imposing
financial penalties for early termination, the option to spread out the cost
of smartphones over a long service period, and technical incompatibility
between handsets.
Credit card consumers can apply for another card online in a matter
of minutes, while broadband consumers incur far greater transaction costs
and inconvenience in changing carriers.  Significant lock-in also occurs
when consumers opt to use a wireless handset manufactured by Apple and
one using the Google Android operating system.  Similarly, the band-
wagon effect creates major disincentives for individuals to refrain from
abandoning the market leader for another option having fewer
subscribers.
By examining both sides of a digital broadband platform market,
courts and regulatory agencies can enhance the accuracy of their assess-
ment of competition and whether consumers benefit or suffer from in-
termediaries having significant market share.  In turn, they can better
calibrate a remedy or reach an empirically supported conclusion that no
market intervention is necessary.
2. Consider Whether and How Lock-In Exists
Courts and regulatory agencies should consider the product and ser-
vice options available to digital broadband subscribers.  In some instances,
they have ample choices which prevent lock-in and evidence a competitive
$7.329 billion in annual revenue.  Sprint had 58.741 million subscribers and gener-
ated $5.560 billion in annual revenue.  The fifth largest carrier U.S. Cellular had
4.996 million subscribers and generated $746 million in annual revenue. See Mike
Dano, How Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, Sprint and More Stacked Up in Q1 2017: The Top
7 Carriers, FIERCEWIRELESS (May 8, 2017, 03:41 PM), http://www.fiercewireless
.com/wireless/how-verizon-at-t-t-mobile-sprint-and-more-stacked-up-q1-2017-top-7-
carriers [https://perma.cc/P39B-4M8J].
180. The top cable television broadband network providers, as of the fourth
quarter in 2016: Comcast with 24.701 million subscribers, Charter with 22.593 mil-
lion subscribers, and Altice USA with 4.167 million subscribers. See Daniel Frankel,
The Top 6 Cable, Satellite and Telco Pay-TV Operators in Q4: Ranking Comcast, Charter
and More, FIERCECABLE (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.fiercecable.com/cable/top-6-
cable-satellite-and-telco-pay-tv-operators-q4-ranking-comcast-charter-and-more
[https://perma.cc/AGF7-AQBL].  As of the third quarter in 2016, AT&T had 14.2
million broadband subscribers and generated $40.9 billion in total annual reve-
nue.  Verizon had 7.04 million broadband subscribers and generated $30.9 billion
in total annual revenue.  CenturyLink had 5.95 million broadband subscribers and
generated $3.92 billion in total annual revenue.  Frontier had 4.4 million broad-
band subscribers and generated $2.52 billion in total annual revenue. See Sean
Buckley, The Top 12 Wireline Providers in Q3 2016: AT&T and Verizon See Broadband
Gains, but Cable Retains the Upper Hand, FIERCETELECOM (Nov. 21, 2016, 11:45 AM),
http://www.fiercetelecom.com/telecom/top-12-wireline-providers-q3-2016-at-t-
and-verizon-see-broadband-gains-but-cable-retains [https://perma.cc/GH63-
6HG2].
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marketplace.181  However, in other instances lock-in occurs, because con-
sumers have few alternatives, or they incur costs, inconvenience, or re-
duced benefits if they leave the dominant platform.
Lock-in can occur even when alternative options exist.  For example,
an electronic commerce site, like eBay, may steer subscribers to its for-
merly-affiliated electronic funds transfer platform operated by PayPal,
even though alternative payment systems exist and can be used.  Consum-
ers have incentives to use PayPal, because the eBay site appears to favor
and expedite such transactions and most vendors prefer to receive pay-
ment via PayPal.  The preference for PayPal and the greater ease consum-
ers have in using the preferred payment system generate substantial
motivations to take the promoted and preferred path of least resistance.
Courts and regulatory agencies have to consider the potential for
lock-in beyond simply assessing whether a specific market segment has
multiple platform operators.  The existence of alternatives, by itself, does
not evidence ample multi-homing options.  In the absence of service alter-
natives, courts, and regulators should consider downstream consumers’
quality of experience to ensure that the apparent preference for a single
platform option promotes convenience and enhances consumer welfare.
3. Assess Market Impacts, Rather than Simply Calculate Market Share
As noted, courts and regulators generally refrain from reaching con-
clusions about market competitiveness based solely on calculations show-
ing a concentrated market or one dominated by a single venture.  Large
firms having high market share may evidence a firm’s superior business
acumen or the need for ventures to accrue economies of scale to thrive in
a specific market segment.
On the other hand, market dominance may have significant and po-
tentially adverse impacts on consumers and the potential for competition.
Significant harm may arise not just because a firm has a dominant market
share, but because it can leverage dominance in one market to dominate
other market segments.  For example, Google dominates the market for
Internet search and advertising, despite ample multi-homing alterna-
tives.182  Regulatory and antitrust intervention is not warranted simply be-
cause Google has acquired substantial market share in Internet search.
However, the company’s success in dominating the search market also
181. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 11, at 363.
182. Google has an estimated 79.88% share of the Internet search market in
the United States as of the third quarter 2016. See Matt Southern, Latest Search
Market Share Numbers: Google Search Up Across All Devices, SEARCH ENGINE J. (Aug. 31,
2016), https://www.searchenginejournal.com/august-2016-search-market-share/
172078/ [https://perma.cc/MP64-CS97].  “Last year, Google held 75.8 percent of
the search ad market, bringing in $24.6 billion in revenue from search ads.  That’s
expected to grow to $36.62 billion in revenue, or 80.2 percent of the market, in
2019.”  Tess Townsend, Google’s Share of the Search Ad Market Is Expected to Grow,
RECODE (Mar. 14, 2017, 09:05 AM), https://www.recode.net/2017/3/14/148901
22/google-search-ad-market-share-growth [https://perma.cc/N3GZ-Y6PW].
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translates into substantial market share in the auctioning of advertising
opportunities to search consumers.183
Courts and regulators may need to consider the inter-relationship be-
tween a venture’s successes in two or more markets, because dominance in
combined or interdependent markets may trigger new or greater risks for
consumers.  Just as platform intermediary operation affects both down-
stream and upstream users, so too can market success in one market gen-
erate unrivaled opportunities to extend market power elsewhere.  Such
leverage may have adverse impacts on the potential for new competition,
even from innovative ventures.  While the FCC has concentrated on fore-
closing the potential for anticompetitive practices of ISPs operating bi-
ased, non-neutral networks, perhaps even greater harm can arise in the
accrual of market power by combining dominance in two or more inter-
mediary markets, e.g., Google’s dominance in Internet search and
advertising.184
VII. CONCLUSION
Digital broadband technologies and markets have reached a critical
mass of market penetration and efficiency enhancements highlighted by
embedded platforms.  The Internet ecosystem has many markets
predominated by single ventures that have acquired dominance in winner
take all competition that rewards ventures best able to exploit positive net-
work externalities.  Intermediaries have conferred significant, identifiable
benefits to consumers, who also incur offsetting costs, not all of which can
be easily quantified or measured.
Intermediary platform operators can calibrate cost recovery from
both upstream and downstream users.  In many instances, downstream
consumers have benefitted from subsidies and pricing strategies that re-
duce or eliminate direct out-of-pocket costs.  However, subsidy payers,
such as advertisers, eventually recoup their costs through higher charges
for goods and services.  In light of enhancements in the acquisition, analy-
sis, and marketing of consumer behavior data, both vendors and platform
intermediaries now have more diversified and extensive ways to recoup
costs and to improve prospects for generating more revenues.  Such data
mining can impose new costs on consumers who have to tolerate more
extensive privacy intrusions in exchange for access to so-called free ser-
183. See Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of
User Data, 31 YALE J.  REG. 401, 411 (2014) (“Google’s monopoly of the online
search advertising market causes clear harm to consumers.  The most apparent
harm is reduced competition in the online advertising market, where the higher
prices charged to advertisers inevitably gets passed onto consumers in the form of
higher prices for the advertised goods and services they buy.  But a deeper harm is
the stunted ‘market’ for user data itself, where lack of vigorous competition means
that users too readily share that data at too low a price—usually for free—in ex-
change for software services that cost Google far less than the value of the user
data it collects.”).
184. See, e.g., Filistrucchi et al., supra note 11, at 308 fig.6.
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vices.  Enhanced consumer surveillance can impose lower or higher costs,
as exemplified by dynamic pricing that frequently changes rates through
algorithmic analysis of overall supply and demand, as well as a prediction
of a prospective customer’s intensity of preference for a particular good or
service.
In light of the mixed impacts of embedded intermediaries on compe-
tition and consumers, legislatures, courts, and regulators should apply up-
to-date tools for assessing current and prospective impacts.  Unfortunately,
the speed of innovation and the convergence of technologies and markets
have exceeded the ability of governments to stay current.  Accordingly, the
tools used to assess market impact have become ill-suited and poorly cali-
brated to meet new challenges.185  Conventional antitrust and economic
theories lack an emphasis on identifying both short-term and longer-term
consequences of platform operations.  While immediate consumer welfare
enhancement supports regulatory forbearance, governments need to con-
sider whether and how longer-term impacts will remain benign or
favorable.
In too many instances, governments have overstated consumer bene-
fits and the absence of competitive harm because they have not consid-
ered an intermediary’s impact on both upstream and downstream
markets, have failed to consider fully whether and how subscriber lock-in
has occurred, and have come up with all sorts of rationales to excuse sub-
stantial market concentration based on short-term consumer benefits that
may not be as generous if offsetting privacy intrusions are factored in the
calculus.
Going forward, governments should appreciate that platform in-
termediaries do not operate as charities and that the conferral of benefits
to consumers may be offset by negative impacts on both consumers and
competition, even in the short term.  A more holistic examination of im-
pacts, without placing a premium on short-term consumer benefits, would
generate a more accurate assessment of the mixed impacts generated by
platform intermediaries.
185. See Rachel Brandenburger et al., Merger Control Revisited: Are Antitrust Au-
thorities Investigating the Right Deals?, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 28, 29 (2017) (“While
traditional [merger and acquisition] filing thresholds such as revenue and market
share are meant to capture transactions likely to give rise to competition concerns
in most sectors, some antitrust authorities are now questioning whether the thresh-
olds are adequate to identify potentially anticompetitive transactions in certain sec-
tors, such as biotechnology and high-tech.  The potential for innovation or a
unique repository of ‘big data’ are often key features of these sectors—and some
question whether a company’s small current revenues might mask its likely future
competitive significance.”).
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